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“Don’t Mention This to the Gestapo for Now”

Betrayal, Corruption, and Sexual Abuse in the Everyday Life of the *Umwandererzentralstelle* Litzmannstadt

Abstract

The case of Erich Lorenz, the commander of the Flottwellstraße camp of the *Umwandererzentralstelle* (UWZ) in Litzmannstadt (Łódź), who committed suicide in 1941, offers insights into the daily life and dynamics of the UWZ under National Socialist rule. Through a micro-historical approach, this case exemplifies the opportunities for abuse that arose in the occupied East, where acts of corruption and violence were frequent. While administrative files and personal testimonies provide a fragmented but revealing picture, they also require critical analysis, as many sources aimed to conceal or redirect blame. The investigation into Lorenz’s financial misconduct and sexual relations with Polish women underscores the widespread culture of impunity and exploitation within the UWZ. Furthermore, the close-knit personal relationships among SS members, the cover-up of wrongdoings, and the punishment of those who exposed misconduct illustrate the internal dynamics of power structures, built on self-interest and mutual protection.

On 8 August 1941, Erich Lorenz, the commander of the Flottwellstraße camp of the *Umwandererzentralstelle* (Central Resettlement Office, UWZ) in Litzmannstadt (Łódź), killed himself. The investigation that ensued after his death, along with the statements of his colleagues, friends, and relatives, provides insight into everyday life in the camp city of Litzmannstadt. This life was marked by a self-perception as a “master race”, as well as by corruption, and even sexual abuse. In the occupied Polish territories, SS men of the German occupation authorities were able to get away with much that would not have been tolerated back home. This article attempts to reconstruct the Lorenz case using a micro-historical approach.¹ The UWZ camps were as much places of violence for those affected as they were places of service for the perpetrators.² The aim of this article is to make comprehensible what the everyday life of

1 It is inspired by essays and books that combine the history of violence with everyday history, such as: Jochen Böhrer, “Die heile Welt des Eduard Schmidt. Gewalt und Alltag deutscher Polizeiformationen und Dienststellen in Polen 1939–1943”, in *Gewalt und Alltag im besetzten Polen 1939–1945*, ed. Jochen Böhrer and Stephan Lehnstaedt (Fibre-Verlag, 2012); Maren Röger, “Von Fischotter und seiner Frau Besatzungsalltag und NS-Rassenpolitik am Beispiel eines deutsch-polnischen Paares im Generalgouvernement”, *Historische Zeitschrift* 299, no. 1 (2018): 70–98; Markus Roth, *Herrenmenschen. Die deutschen Kreishauptleute im besetzten Polen – Karrierewege, Herrschaftspraxis und Nachgeschichte* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2009); Elissa Koslov Mailänder, *Gewalt im Dienstalltag. Die SS-Aufseherinnen des Konzentrations- und Vernichtungslagers Majdanek 1942–1944* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2009).

2 Stephan Lehnstaedt, “Zwei Okkupationsregime. Einleitende Überlegungen zur Erforschung von Gewalt und Alltag im besetzten Polen”, in *Gewalt und Alltag im besetzten Polen 1939–1945* (Osnabrück: Fibre-Verlag, 2012), 21; Alexa Stiller, “Gewalt und Alltag der Volkstumspolitik. Der Apparat des Reichskommissars für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums und andere gesellschaftliche Akteure der veralltäglichten Gewalt”, in *Gewalt und Alltag im besetzten Polen 1939–1945* (Osnabrück: Fibre-Verlag, 2012), 58.

a UWZ man looked like, but also to understand the dynamics that prevailed in National Socialist power structures, and thus the possibilities of comradesly cohesion as well as the internal and external sanctioning of alleged crimes. The article is based on comprehensive, previously unprocessed source material on the UWZ. General information on the UWZ Litzmannstadt can be found in administrative files, most of which are stored in the *Instytut Pamięci Narodowej* (Institute of National Remembrance, IPN) in Warsaw.³ Additionally, SS personnel files from the Bundesarchiv in Berlin and files from the DÖW in Vienna were used.⁴

German Deportation Policy in Poland and the UWZ

After the invasion of Poland, the German occupiers divided the western parts of Poland they occupied into two zones – the territories annexed to Germany that were to be “Germanised” and the *Generalgouvernement* (General Government) further East. As ethnic Germans from the Soviet sphere of influence were to settle in the annexed territories, unwanted groups – until March 1941, a total of 408,525 people was affected – were to be forcibly resettled in the Generalgouvernement.⁵ As the settlement of ethnic German groups living predominantly as farmers became more important,⁶ non-Jewish Polish landowners were increasingly targeted for deportation,⁷ while Jews were forced to live in ghettos.⁸ In order not to shift this potential agricultural labour force exclusively to the Generalgouvernement, however, the deported families were first checked for their potential “Germanisation” or labour in newly established “resettlement camps” controlled by the UWZ.⁹

The UWZ was headed by Rolf-Heinz Höppner and its official headquarters were in Posen (Poznań). It formed the interface between Eichmann’s Department IV D 4 in the RSHA¹⁰ – responsible for planning deportation policy and communicating with the Reichsbahn – and the local Kreishauptleute, Arbeitsstäbe, and police for carrying out resettlement actions. The UWZ had seven departments, for example for administration or police operations.¹¹ Of particular importance, however, was the camp inspectorate, responsible for monitoring five resettlement camps with a total of around 8,000 inmates.¹² The camp inspectorate was not located in Posen, but in

3 Especially relevant are IPN GK 69 (Umwandererzentralstelle Posen) and GK 68 (Umwandererzentralstelle Posen, Nebenstelle Litzmannstadt).

4 For Berlin, see Bundesarchiv (Barch) R 9361-III Personalakten SS. For DÖW, see, among others, DÖW 23675/3 and DÖW 21955/5.

5 Alexa Stiller, *Völkische Politik. Praktiken der Exklusion und Inklusion in polnischen, französischen und slowenischen Annexionsgebieten 1939–1945* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2022), 481–483. Approximately 70,000 of these early deportees were Jews. Alexandra Pulvermacher, “Early Deportations of Jews in Occupied Poland (October 1939–June 1940): The German and the Soviet Cases”, *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 36, no. 2 (Autumn 2022): 125–153.

6 For example, Maria Wardzyńska, *Wysiedlenia ludności polskiej z okupowanych ziem polskich włączonych do III Rzeszy w latach 1939–1945* (Warsaw: IPN, 2017), 175.

7 For the experiences of those affected, see source editions such as Ryszard Dylński, *Wysiedlenie i poniewierka. Wspomnienia Polaków wysiedlonych przez okupanta hitlerowskiego z ziem polskich „wcielonych” do Rzeszy 1939–1945* (Poznań: Wydaw. Poznańskie, 1985).

8 Götz Aly, *„Endlösung”. Völkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europäischen Juden* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1995).

9 Phillip Rutherford, *Prelude to the Final Solution: The Nazi Program for Deporting Ethnic Poles, 1939–1941* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 144.

10 David Cesarani, *Adolf Eichmann. Bürokrat und Massenmörder* (Berlin: List Taschenbuch, 2012).

11 IPN GK 68/6, Allocation of responsibilities of the UWZ, 19 April 1940, 3–4.

12 The camp inspection was supported by Department VI (medical care of the camps) as well as Department IV (RuS leaders, which became an “independent external branch” at the end of 1940). IPN GK 69/25(1), Copy of the final report on the “resettlements” of the “Volhynia Action”, 4–12.

the UWZ's more important branch office in Litzmannstadt (Hermann Göringstraße 56, today ul. Piotrkowska 133).¹³ While “fundamental and organisational questions” were dealt with in Posen, a varying number of field offices,¹⁴ the transports to the Generalgouvernement, as well as the “resettlement camps”, were managed from Litzmannstadt.¹⁵

After their arrival in the city, the deportees were first sent to the general UWZ-selection-camp (*Schleusungslager*) in Flottwellstraße (earlier Wiesenstraße, today ul. Łąkowa), where they had to undergo an initial “screening”.¹⁶ Those who at first glance appeared “unsuitable for permanent residence in Germany” were immediately taken to the Tauentzienstraße camp (earlier Luisenstraße, today ul. 28. Pułk Strzelców Kaniowskich).¹⁷ The others were examined by the so-called “racial examiners” of the *Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt* (RuSHA).¹⁸ If they were found to be fit for work or “Germanisation”, they were also sent to the Konstantynów camp in Konstantynów (today ul. Łódzkiej 27) near Litzmannstadt and later to Germany. All others were brought to Tauentzienstraße, where they awaited deportation to the Generalgouvernement.¹⁹ Later, additional camps were set up in the city and Litzmannstadt remained central in this process.²⁰ The head of the UWZ Litzmannstadt, Hermann Krumej (together with his deputy Hermann Püschel),²¹ was described as “indispensable for the work” there.²² He was actively involved in shaping deportation policy on the ground. When protests by *Generalgouverneur* Hans Frank and (still largely secret) preparations for war against the Soviet Union led to a complete halt to deportations in March 1941, the UWZ had to assert itself against resettlements carried out independently by local authorities.²³ Although deportations to the Generalgouvernement were no longer possible, the UWZ was able to retain its central function thanks to Krumej's efforts. Until its dissolution in 1944, it conducted “selections” of evicted families and either sent them to Germany or instructed them to stay with relatives.²⁴ The deportations were never resumed. The Germans concentrated their resources on the Holocaust instead.

13 IfZ MA 708/5, Letter of the RSHA to Krumej, 17 April 1940, 361.

14 By April 1940, there were field offices in Wieluń, Koło, Sieradz, Lask, and Konin. Phillip Rutherford, *Prelude to the Final Solution*, 141. The exact number and location, however, changed. Stiller, *Völkische Politik*, 232–234.

15 See, for example, IPN GK 68/204, Letter by Höppner to Krumej regarding transports, 21 June 1940, 16.

16 Maria Rutowska, “Aussiedlungen von Polen und Juden”, in *Vertriebene von 1939*, ed. Jacek Kubiak (Wydawnictwo miejskie Poznań, 2015), 36–38.

17 IfZ MA 708/5, Letter from the SD Head Office Posen to Office III in the RSHA dated 14 March 1941, 415. The Konstantynów camp had since January 1940 already been in use as a resettlement camp and increasingly became the starting point for the deportation of forced labourers to the Old Reich. S. Abramowicz, “Niemiecki obóz przesiedleńczy w Konstantynowie Łódzkim 1940/1943”, in *Ludność cywilna w łódzkich obozach przesiedleńczych*, ed. Joanna Żelazko (Łódź: IPN, 2010); Stiller, *Völkische Politik*, 424–441.

18 The SS Race and Resettlement Office was responsible for racial examinations and marriage licenses for members of the SS as well as the “racial evaluation” and selection of the populations in the occupied territories. Isabel Heinemann, *Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut. Das Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2013), 345.

19 IPN GK 68/109, Selection of labourers during the resettlement operation by the UWZ, 1 April 1940, 17.

20 Michael G. Esch, “Die Umwandererzentralstelle im besetzten Polen 1939–1944”, in *Migration steuern und verwalten. Deutschland vom späten 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, ed. Jochen Oltmer (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2003).

21 BArch R 9361-III/548684, Letter by Krumej regarding Püschel's promotion, 11 February 1942, 437.

22 IPN GK 68/94, Letter by Höppner to Amt III B at RSHA 30 May 1941, 2–3.

23 IPN GK 69/15, Letter by Krumej to all field offices, 2 November 1940, 106.

24 Stiller, *Völkische Politik*, 515–516.

The Everyday Life of UWZ Men and the Lorenz Case

The German civil administration was typically manned by staff from Germany and politically reliable ethnic Germans.²⁵ In theory, only the best were supposed to come to the East. However, due to staff shortages, institutions in Poland could not be too selective.²⁶ This was also the case for the UWZ²⁷ where, in addition to guards and “racial examiners”, employees such as typists or drivers (sixteen alone in the Flottwellstraße camp), as well as qualified SS leaders, had to be found.²⁸ The shortage of staff influenced its composition. The SS leaders came from all over Germany, Austria, and the Sudetenland, had varying educational backgrounds, and belonged to different generations. However, a solid core of UWZ men who stayed with the UWZ for several months to years formed.²⁹ There seems to have been a collegial atmosphere among them.³⁰ Not only did they support one another in the face of accusations from the outside,³¹ or suggest employees for promotion,³² but, just like in other institutions in the East, they often spent their free time together.³³ Birthday parties,³⁴ excursions³⁵ and other get-togethers are recorded.³⁶ In some cases, the SS leaders had brought their families to the East. Marriage and family life contributed to the crimes in the East, as the career in Poland then took on the form of a normal profession.³⁷ In the case of the UWZ, however, marriage also made an active contribution, as some wives and children were employed by the UWZ.³⁸ As a result, business and private life got mixed up in everyday life.

On 8 August, a sudden death shook this small community. A few days earlier, SS-*Obersturmführer* Erich Lorenz had been accused of sexual intercourse and “orgies” with Polish women in an internal complaint by his UWZ colleague, Ludwig Witthinrich, the commander of another UWZ camp:³⁹

[d]rinking and dancing would continue late into the night and into the early hours of the morning. When L.[orenz] was alone, he would summon a Polish girl from the Flottwellstrasse camp to spend the night entertaining himself with her.⁴⁰

25 IPN GK 68/214, Activity report of the UWZ field office in Konin, 25 April 1940, 4.

26 Florian Dierl, Zoran Janjetović, und Karsten Linne, *Pflicht, Zwang und Gewalt. Arbeitsverwaltungen und Arbeitskräftepolitik im deutsch besetzten Polen und Serbien 1939–1944* (Essen: Klartext, 2013), 76.

27 IPN GK 69/20, Letter by Krumey to Eichmann regarding staff shortage, 10 September 1940, 80. This was also the case with other institutions in Litzmannstadt, such as the Ordnungspolizei. Bartosz Wójcik, *Vernichtungsaltag. Die Deutsche Ordnungspolizei in den annektierten polnischen Gebieten 1939–1945 Fallstudie Łódz/Litzmannstadt* (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2021), 451.

28 IPN GK 68/23, List of employees paid by the office, 2–3.

29 If employees were found to be unsuitable, they could lose their position despite the staff shortage. For example, the camp leader, Dr. Lach, forced pregnant women, the elderly, and children to participate in physical exercises. IPN GK 68/52, Letter by Krumey to Höppner regarding Dr. Lach, 13 November 1940, 8.

30 For example, they addressed each other as “dear comrade”. IPN GK 69/227, Letter by Krumey to Walter Vogel, 16 November 1940, 13; IPN GK 69/216, Letter by Püschel to Hermann Münzner, 8 March 1941, 30.

31 IPN GK 69/61, Memo regarding the misconduct of SS Sturmann Leysers, 16 July 1940, 2–3.

32 IPN GK 69/204, Copy of the promotion certificate for Artur Harder, 20 April 1940, 24; IPN GK 69/223, Letter by Krumey to SS-Oberabschnitt Süd regarding Kaspar Schwarzhuber, 10 September 1941, 33.

33 Böhler, “Heile Welt”, 114.

34 IPN GK 69/229, Letter by Mollenhauer to Krumey regarding a get-together, 1 February 1942, 35.

35 IPN GK 69/215, Letter by Witthinrich to the Regierungspräsident, 23 February 1942, 8.

36 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Statement by Johann Orant regarding Lorenz, 27 January 1942, 762.

37 Stephan Lehnstaedt, *Okkupation im Osten. Besatzeralltag in Warschau und Minsk 1939–1944* (München: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2010), 233.

38 The wives of Willi Schmidtsiefen, Emma (IPN GK 69/429), and of Rudolf Barth (IPN GK 68/23) worked at the UWZ. The son of the office leader, SS-Untersturmführer Josef Peters, worked in the Obornik field office. IPN GK 69/60, Report of the Obornik field office by Josef Peters, 31 August 1940, 4.

39 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Witthinrich to the SS Main Office, 7 February 1942, 753–755. His camp was located in Gneisenaustraße UWZ camp (today ul. Żeligowskiego).

40 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Ludwig Witthinrich to Krumey regarding Lorenz, 29 January 1942, 761.

Krumey then reported Lorenz to the Gestapo in Litzmannstadt on August 6 to “clarify the facts of the case”,⁴¹ whereupon Lorenz was arrested and hanged himself in his cell just two days later.⁴² Forced sexual contact by members of the SS was common in occupied Poland. Physical coercion or blackmail was often used and places of imprisonment, such as camps, were particularly exposed to this behaviour.⁴³ In many cases, however, such contacts were quietly tolerated and did not lead to arrests.⁴⁴ Lorenz, though, was accused of further misconduct after his arrest.

Accusations of Embezzlement and Lorenz’s Past

In the course of the Gestapo investigation, Lorenz was found to have embezzled around 40,000 Reichsmarks.⁴⁵ Working at the UWZ offered numerous opportunities for self-enrichment.⁴⁶ For Lorenz, as head of the camp that all deportees passed through, it was easy to pocket personal belongings or valuables. This was not the first time he committed wrongdoings in this regard. Lorenz was born in Rostock in 1906 and had been a Nazi Party member since 1932.⁴⁷ In 1936, he began working for the *Sicherheitsdienst* (SD)⁴⁸ Marienwerder (East Prussia) in Rosenberg. Once he began working there, the branch office started to experience difficulties with monthly expenses as Lorenz repeatedly asked for additional funds.⁴⁹ After he had long left Rosenberg (he had been working for the UWZ’s predecessor organisation since November 1939),⁵⁰ disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him in January 1941. As part of these proceedings, it was discovered that he had incurred a number of debts while in Rosenberg.⁵¹ Lorenz blamed his financial difficulties on his wife’s illness and her “inadequate economic management”.⁵² As both the mayor of Rosenberg⁵³ and Krumey (who attested to Lorenz’s “impeccable SS-like attitude”)⁵⁴ gave him a positive review, the disciplinary proceedings were discontinued on 30 April 1941, just three months before his death.⁵⁵ Lorenz emphasized that he had managed to move into “settled circumstances” during his time at the UWZ.⁵⁶ It might have been the embezzlement he was later accused of that helped him in this.

Lorenz’s background makes two things clear. First, it is likely that the embezzlement accusations made against the already dead Lorenz in the summer of 1941

41 IPN GK 69/212, Letter from Krumey to IdS Damzog, 6 August 1941, 16.

42 IPN GK 69/212 Letter from Krumey to IdS Damzog, 11 August 1941, 17–18.

43 Maren Röger, *Kriegsbeziehungen. Intimität, Gewalt und Prostitution im besetzten Polen* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2015), 189.

44 A guard was caught “in an unmistakable situation, standing closely with a Polish girl”. IPN GK 69/149, Report on the auxiliary policeman Bülow, 25 January 1941, 12.

45 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Dr. Kaufmann to Referat ID 1 RSHA regarding Lorenz’s suicide 31 October 1941, 756.

46 IPN GK 69/20, Telegram from Krumey to Eichmann, 17 August 1940, 49.

47 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Investigation results of the IdS Königsberg, 30 April 1941, 599.

48 The SD, founded in 1931, was the intelligence agency of the SS. In 1939, it became, alongside the Gestapo, a department in the newly established *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*.

49 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Letter from Erich Pullert to the head of the S Marienwerder, 1 August 1939, 660–661.

50 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Interrogation transcript of Lorenz, 11 February 1941, 621–626.

51 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Letter from the IdS Königsberg to the RSHA I D 2 regarding Lorenz, 30 January 1941, 638.

52 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Letter from the IdS Königsberg to the RSHA ID 2 regarding Lorenz, 24 March 1941, 612.

53 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Interrogation transcript of the mayor of Rosenberg, 4 April 1941, 609–611.

54 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Letter from Krumey to IdS Königsberg regarding Lorenz, 7 March 1941, 614.

55 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Investigation results of the IdS Königsberg, 30 April 1941, 599.

56 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Letter from IdS Königsberg to RSHA I D 2 regarding Lorenz, 24 March 1941, 612.

were true. After Lorenz started working for the UWZ, he could apparently steal from the deportees – as well as the *Haupttreuhandstelle Ost* that was supposed to process the possessions – for quite some time with impunity. Due to a lack of oversight in combination with the already mentioned staff shortages, the East presented many opportunities for self-enrichment. Second, and more importantly, Lorenz's background underscores that Krumei was at least aware of the accusations made against Lorenz in the past as Lorenz informed him of the investigation. Krumei was later accused by Witthinrich of having also at least been in the know when it came to Lorenz's activities at the UWZ. Before Witthinrich was questioned by the Gestapo, Krumei allegedly asked him what he knew about the allegations of embezzlement:

I [Witthinrich] replied to him: "As an SS leader, I prefer not to speak about this since most of what I know is only hearsay. Those directly involved who knew about it should speak first". Obersturmbannführer Krumei responded to me, "That's right, don't mention this to the Gestapo for now, as it could drag other circles into it. Police Inspector Haarbrücker has just reported to me that he has completed the inspection of L[orenz]'s camp, and everything is in perfect order. At least in this regard, we are in the clear."⁵⁷

Due to personal animosities that will be discussed below, Witthinrich's statement is questionable, but nonetheless very interesting. It shows that Lorenz's embezzlement might have been known to several UWZ men, including himself. Embezzlement and corruption in general and for the UWZ specifically – as other reports suggest – were common.⁵⁸ Embezzlement was often so widespread that it was not enough of a reason to remove a camp commander from his post.⁵⁹ It was only after Witthinrich had accused Lorenz of intercourse with Polish women that the embezzlement accusations seemed to have come up.

The only other person who faced consequences connected to Lorenz's case was an SS trainee by the name of Schlag. He had had the task of transferring the assets "confiscated" by the UWZ in Lorenz's camp to the *Haupttreuhandstelle Ost*,⁶⁰ and he was also mentioned in Witthinrich's complaint. Schlag had allegedly also been present at Lorenz's "orgies". In connection with this, Schlag's general integrity began to be questioned and he was dismissed in August 1941. However, no evidence of embezzlement was found against him,⁶¹ even though his records were subsequently reviewed and examined for inconsistencies.⁶² Krumei only stated that there was suspicion "that Schlag must have been aware of the inaccuracies of [...] Lorenz without reporting them".⁶³ Nevertheless, the narrative of complicity prevailed.⁶⁴ It stands to reason that Lorenz, after his death, and Schlag, who was only an SS candidate, were good scapegoats. Whoever was responsible for or involved in the loss of 40,000 Reichsmarks could now breathe a sigh of relief. Even if Krumei may not have been actively involved, it is reasonable to suspect that he was at least aware of what was happening. This made a detailed investigation into the missing money all the less

57 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Witthinrich to the SS Main Office regarding Krumei, 7 February 1942, 753–755.

58 IPN GK 69/229, Letter from Mollenhauer to Krumei, 3 April 1942, 52.

59 Frank Bajohr, *Parvenis und Profiteure. Korruption in der NS-Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2001), 91.

60 IPN GK 69/322, Certificate for Erich Schlag by Krumei, 5 December 1941, 14.

61 IPN GK 69/322, Letter from the UWZ to the 112th SS-Standarte regarding Erich Schlag, 4 October 1941, 37.

62 IPN GK 69/322, Copies of letters from Schlag, 22 September 1941, 9–11.

63 IPN GK 69/322, Certificate for Erich Schlag by Krumei, 5 December 1941, 14.

64 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Witthinrich to the SS Main Office regarding Krumei, 7 February 1942, 753–755.

desirable. Krumei wanted to let the matter blow over. When a former secretary gave him new details about the matter in December 1941,⁶⁵ he asked her “politely and urgently” not to bother him anymore.⁶⁶ The Lorenz case, however, was anything but closed.

Lorenz’s Wife, Mistress, and the SS Investigation

The case was reopened following a complaint from Lorenz’s widow. On August 9, she had been informed that Lorenz had committed suicide while in detention. She allegedly did not react surprised,⁶⁷ and she then travelled from her home in Sudetenland to Litzmannstadt to settle formalities. During her stay, she learned that her husband had shared an apartment with Marlotte Broszeit, a typist from the camp inspectorate. Broszeit had left Litzmannstadt after Lorenz’s death to look after her own as well as his parents.⁶⁸ Mrs. Lorenz, however, made accusations against other UWZ employees who had not only neglected to point out to Lorenz “the unworthy nature of his conduct” as an SS leader, but had regularly visited the couple’s apartment and allegedly addressed Broszeit as “Mrs. Lorenz”.⁶⁹

At the beginning of January 1942, an investigation into the Lorenz case was initiated by the *Personalamt D 1 (Dienststrafsachen)* of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA)*⁷⁰, which brought this previously unaddressed aspect of Lorenz’s numerous transgressions into the spotlight. Connected to this, the *Inspekteur der Sipo und des SD (IdS)* Posen, Ernst Damzog, asked for statements on Lorenz’s financial situation and his relationship with Broszeit from the UWZ men allegedly involved.⁷¹ They all stated that they had been to Lorenz’s apartment several times to play cards and drink beer and schnapps with other UWZ men and their wives (such as Witthinrich and his wife), and occasionally with Krumei.⁷² Broszeit was usually also present. However, they emphasised that they never played for large sums,⁷³ and that it had only “subsequently become known” that Lorenz had “spent larger sums on other occasions”. Allegedly, however, no one had reason to suspect that Lorenz as “an old SS-leader” would be in financial trouble.⁷⁴ All those questioned made efforts to downplay their connection to Lorenz. Krumei, for example, said that although he had accepted Lorenz’s invitation three times, he had not “socialized” with him and

[i]n professional terms, there was initially nothing to reproach L. for, as he deliberately did everything to conceal his true character, even from me. To what extent Br.[oszeit] was aware of L.’s activities is beyond my knowledge.⁷⁵

The UWZ staff was careful to hide any possible involvement in misconduct. Thus, their statements of Lorenz’s relationship with Broszeit were also similar to each other. Most of them emphasised that they were aware of the relationship but did not see it

65 IPN GK 69/212, Letter from Broszeit to Krumei, 8 December 1941, 75–77.

66 IPN GK 69/212, Letter from Krumei to Broszeit, 15 December 1941, 78.

67 IPN GK 69/212, Telegram from the SD section Reichberg to the UWZ Litzmannstadt, 9 August 1941, 30–31.

68 IPN GK 69/212, Letter from Broszeit to Krumei, 8 December 1941, 75–77.

69 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Dr. Kaufmann to Referat ID 1 RSHA regarding Lorenz, 31 October 1941, 756.

70 The RSHA was a central security agency that coordinated the SS, police, and intelligence services.

71 IPN GK 69/212, Personalakte Lorenz, Schreiben des IdS Damzog an die UWZ Litzmannstadt vom 14. Jänner 1942, 80.

72 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Witthinrich to Krumei regarding Lorenz, 29 January 1942, 761.

73 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Statement by Johann Orant regarding Lorenz, 27 January 1942, 762.

74 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Statement by Hilmar Haarbrückner regarding Lorenz, 28 January 1942, 763.

75 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Krumei regarding Lorenz, 30 January 1942, 760.

as an obstacle to social relations. In other institutions in the East, much stricter conditions prevailed. Women who got involved in affairs with married men in their department were often transferred.⁷⁶ The UWZ did not seem to be that strict. After all, Lorenz had apparently assured his colleagues that he had already set his divorce in motion and intended to marry Broszeit. Krumey, too, stated that Lorenz had convincingly conveyed both his intention to divorce (as well as his wife's consent to said divorce) and his plans to marry. He emphasised that he had repeatedly admonished Lorenz and urged him to "arrange for a residential separation between him and Broszeit" prior to the wedding.⁷⁷ The allegations that Broszeit had been addressed as "Mrs. Lorenz" were denied by all the SS men involved.⁷⁸ As one of them put it: "[d]uring my visits to Lorenz's apartments, nothing occurred that could have caused offense or went beyond the bounds of a collegial gathering."⁷⁹

The claim that there were no doubts about Lorenz's intention to marry seems hardly credible, at least in the case of Krumey who was aware of Lorenz's previous disciplinary proceedings. After all, Lorenz had displayed similar behaviour in Rosenberg, where he had caused a scandal not only with his finances but also through his relationship with his housemaid, Ella Pohl. He had allegedly gotten her pregnant and promised to marry her. Following his transfer, she reportedly attempted suicide.⁸⁰ Lorenz did admit to the relationship but once again justified it with his wife's illness,⁸¹ and insisted on the woman's lack of credibility, a view that was corroborated by the mayor of Rosenberg.⁸² For, although divorce from his wife had "repeatedly been discussed", it had not occurred out of consideration for his ill wife and their child.⁸³ Lorenz's widow's complaint was also discredited as self-serving. She had supposedly only made the accusations against the UWZ men because they had put obstacles in her way when she wanted to take her deceased husband's furniture.⁸⁴ In general, a picture emerges of the department as a kind of band of brothers who supported each other as comrades. For example, despite knowing about Lorenz's history in Rosenberg, Krumey stressed that he believed Lorenz's intention to marry Broszeit was genuine.

Witthinrich's Revenge

The investigation had placed Krumey, as the head of the UWZ Litzmannstadt, in an uncomfortable position. His situation was further exacerbated by accusations directed at him personally. The interrogations concerning the Lorenz case presented Witthinrich with an opportunity to harm Krumey on a personal level. On 7 February 1942, about a week after submitting his own statement on his involvement with Lorenz, Witthinrich addressed a letter to the *SS Hauptamt* regarding "the behaviour of SS-Obersturmbannführer Krumey". In this letter, he accused Krumey of "insufficient supervision, which led to the suicide of Obersturmführer Lorenz", a "lack of camaraderie", and "violations of the fundamental principles of the SS". Regarding the first point, Witthinrich argued that Krumey had done nothing to intervene in the

76 Lehnstaedt, *Okkupation*, 235.

77 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Krumey regarding Lorenz, 30 January 1942, 760.

78 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Statement by Gustav Bednarz regarding Lorenz, 30 January 1942, 765.

79 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Statement by Johann Orant regarding Lorenz, 27 January 1942, 762.

80 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Letter from IdS Königsberg to RSHA I D 2 regarding Lorenz, 30 January 1941, 638.

81 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Letter from IdS Königsberg to RSHA I D 2 regarding Lorenz, 24 March 1941, 612.

82 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Statement by the mayor of Rosenberg, 4 April 1941, 609–611.

83 BArch R 9361-III/541085, Letter from IdS Königsberg to RSHA I D 2 regarding Lorenz, 24 March 1941, 612.

84 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Haarbrückner to Krumey regarding Lorenz, 28 January 1942, 763.

relationship between Lorenz and Broszeit (whom he referred to as a “whore”) and had attempted to cover up Lorenz’s embezzlement, as mentioned earlier. Witthinrich likely became involved due to a lingering grudge against Krumei, which he explained under the second point, “lack of camaraderie”. In mid-July 1941, Witthinrich had expressed indignation in a letter to the UWZ leadership about being accused by an anonymous individual of having had informal relations with Polish camp personnel. In response, Krumei had conducted an internal investigation about Witthinrich, who vehemently denied the accusations, asserting that he had “never had a glass of beer or schnapps with a Pole” and demanding that “this scoundrel who came up with the malicious slander be punished as an example”.⁸⁵ The matter did not seem to be proceeding to Witthinrich’s satisfaction, as he repeatedly inquired about it with Krumei. The latter eventually stated that he had imposed a “substantial” fine on the “slanderer” but did not disclose the identity of this individual.⁸⁶ After Witthinrich demanded an apology in front of the entire UWZ staff, Krumei finally named the employee Lignarius as the perpetrator.⁸⁷ Witthinrich confronted Lignarius, who denied having anything to do with the matter.⁸⁸ After Lorenz’s arrest, Witthinrich finally learned from Krumei that Lorenz had been the actual source of the rumour.⁸⁹

Witthinrich thus felt unfairly treated and repeatedly asked Krumei for a personal talk on this matter, which never took place.⁹⁰ Instead, Krumei had allegedly assigned one of Witthinrich’s employees, *SS-Hauptscharführer* Fritz Ismer, to “spy” on him by reporting “irregularities” in his camp:

[h]owever, since he was acting correctly and reported that everything was in order here and that he would no longer be used for such spying, an open conflict ensued. In this, *SS-Obersturmbannführer* Krumei said to I[smer], “You are of no use here; you must go to the front”.⁹¹

Witthinrich listed this behaviour under “violations of the SS regulations”. Eventually, Ismer was transferred to the Chełmno extermination camp in the winter of 1941–1942 because of this. This account was confirmed by Ismer in a post-war interrogation.⁹² In his submission to the SS Headquarters, Witthinrich then described the further course of events. Between mid and late January 1942, when the investigation into Lorenz began, Krumei had allegedly decided to “finish off” Witthinrich because he was “too correct” and should not know “everything that’s going on here”. When confronted by Witthinrich about this, Krumei denied making such statements but suggested that Witthinrich “look for another job”. Although Witthinrich had indeed started to do so, he explained his motivation for writing the lengthy complaint about Krumei to ensure “that younger, inexperienced SS comrades are spared from stumbling”.⁹³ Following his letter, an investigation was indeed initiated against Krumei at the Department for SS Disciplinary Affairs in the RSHA under the number 2229/42.⁹⁴

85 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Witthinrich to UWZ, 18 July 1941, 770.

86 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Note regarding Krumei, 782.

87 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Note by Witthinrich, 782.

88 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Note by Witthinrich, 770.

89 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Witthinrich to the SS-Hauptamt regarding Krumei, 7 February 1942, 753–755.

90 IPN GK 69/229, Secret Letter from Witthinrich to Krumei, 3 December 1941, 37.

91 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Witthinrich to the SS-Hauptamt regarding Krumei, 7 February 1942, 753–755.

92 DÖW 21955/5, Protocol of testimony of Fritz Ismers, 9 November 1960, 191–193.

93 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Witthinrich to the SS-Hauptamt regarding Krumei, 7 February 1942, 753–755.

94 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from RSHA, 9 April 1942, 1.

Krumey Collects Evidence

By this point, Krumey really seemed to regard Witthinrich as a thorn in his side. While Witthinrich's initial complaint about Lorenz that had caused his arrest had been an internal one, these new accusations were directed at the SS-Hauptamt. Witthinrich had thus put Krumey in an unpleasant situation. The involvement of external actors was a red line that Krumey did not want Witthinrich to cross with impunity. To get rid of him, it appeared that Krumey needed evidence against him. A number of reports by police sergeant Karl Mollenhauer, also a UWZ man, came in handy in this regard. Already several days before Witthinrich's damaging statements against Krumey, on 1 February 1941, Mollenhauer reported to Krumey that Witthinrich had told him about a notebook with incriminating evidence regarding other UWZ members like Krumey, and stemming from a birthday party where there were other UWZ leaders and their wives.⁹⁵ Whether Witthinrich was aware of these accusations is unknown. In any case, just a few weeks later, he wrote a report in which he accused Mollenhauer of "having relations with a Polish woman". Mollenhauer had invited this woman on an excursion, "touched her inappropriately", and bragged about having "used her sexually", despite both of them being married. As a servant of the Reich, Witthinrich claimed to take offence at this "marriage-violating" behaviour.⁹⁶ In Mollenhauer's justification of the events, he said the woman was actually German, that he had been unaware that she was married to a Pole, and that Witthinrich just wanted take revenge on Mollenhauer because the latter had severed all contact with him in January.⁹⁷

This incident apparently increased Mollenhauer's motivation to write additional reports about Witthinrich from March 1942 onwards. Mollenhauer accused Witthinrich himself of calling Broszeit "Mrs. Lorenz" and of avoiding (unscheduled) inspections of his camp.⁹⁸ Additionally, he allegedly sold beer in the camp and was regularly heavily intoxicated during working hours:

I submit this report to describe his unreliability and his bad character [...]. I declare W[itthinrich] to be a denunciator who continually grumbles against his superiors and an inferior person, whom I have come to know during my many years of service as a gendarme.⁹⁹

The sudden increase in Mollenhauer's reports during the proceedings against Lorenz and Krumey suggests that Krumey was gathering evidence which he could use to get rid of Witthinrich. In a letter from Witthinrich's son to Krumey, the son accused the UWZ leader of spreading false statements about his father, namely that he was a drunk.¹⁰⁰ Witthinrich was either genuinely fond of alcohol, or this was part of Krumey's strategy.

Especially interesting is one report on Witthinrich's alleged ties to the deceased Lorenz. Broszeit had already stated that these two had been close and would do things that "could only be done among good comrades".¹⁰¹ The relationship, however, had deteriorated shortly before Lorenz's arrest. Mollenhauer now described an even-

⁹⁵ IPN GK 69/229, Secret report by Mollenhauer to Krumey, 1 February 1942, 751.

⁹⁶ IPN GK 69/215, Letter from Witthinrich to the Regierungspräsident, 23 February 1942, 8.

⁹⁷ IPN GK 69/215, Letter from Mollenhauer to Püschel, 28 February 1942, 4.

⁹⁸ IPN GK 69/229, Letter from Mollenhauer to Krumey, 5 March 1942, 45.

⁹⁹ IPN GK 69/229, Letter from Mollenhauer to Krumey, 7 March 1942, 49–50.

¹⁰⁰ IPN GK 69/229, Letter from Witthinrich to Krumey, 23 June 1942, 68.

¹⁰¹ IPN GK 69/212, Letter from Broszeit to Krumey, 8 December 1941, 75–77. Broszeit and Witthinrich's wife had also gotten along well. BArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Gustav Bednarz regarding Krumey, 30 January 1942, 765.

ing shortly before Lorenz's death, when the two had argued while intoxicated. Soon after Lorenz's arrest, Witthinrich had said to Mollenhauer, "[t]hank God that bastard is dead. Hopefully, he hasn't dragged anyone else down with him."¹⁰² Broszeit had also written to Krumei about Witthinrich's alleged attempts to implicate her in Lorenz's schemes.¹⁰³ Witthinrich might or might not have been at least informed of Lorenz's schemes. Much more interesting than determining who was specifically involved, however, is the fact that such allegations were never made against Witthinrich publicly – not even by Krumei who had reason to suspect him of being disloyal. He never forwarded these reports to a higher authority. Instead, on 14 April, Krumei finally reported to the IdS Posen, Ernst Damzog, that Witthinrich had embezzled coal.¹⁰⁴ The other accusations from Mollenhauer were either not credible enough or too risky for Krumei. For some reason he seems to have been reluctant to initiate further investigations into the Lorenz case. This either means that Witthinrich's accusations were at least partly true or that he was perceived as a potential future troublemaker. In May 1942, Witthinrich reported new attempts at "defamatory harassment" by Krumei to the SS-Hauptamt. Krumei allegedly "locked a Pole in a cell for 24 hours in freezing cold without a coat" in order to extort false testimony about Witthinrich:

[t]he Pole (the former camp elder) was supposed to falsely testify that money and other items had been taken from the packages. However, even under arrest, the Pole stuck to the truth and reiterated that the packages were always opened by the recipients themselves in accordance with regulations and under the supervision of the camp commandant's office.¹⁰⁵

Even if Krumei had not been aware of Witthinrich's complaint letters to the SS-Hauptamt up to that point, he was still aware through Mollenhauer's reports that Witthinrich could pose a threat to him. Complaints about Krumei's leadership had been expressed by other UWZ men in the past.¹⁰⁶ They had, however, not involved higher authorities as they were directed at Krumei directly and thus did not lead to retaliation. Witthinrich's offenses – the fact that he had complained about the state of affairs at the UWZ Litzmannstadt to the outside – were apparently so serious that they could not be tolerated. Krumei, however, wanted to avoid the matter looking like revenge. This is why, he clarified in a letter to the IdS,

[f]or the sake of order, I would like to point out that I reported Witthinrich's misconduct regarding the unauthorised removal of coal from a UWZ depot before your notification that Witthinrich had filed a complaint against me. With this clarification, I aim to ensure that if Witthinrich is eventually held accountable, it does not appear as though I acted out of revenge.¹⁰⁷

Krumei's strategy was successful. Witthinrich, who had been on leave since March 1942 and had continued to live in the apartment provided by the UWZ, was forced to spend the time until his next assignment in his hometown due to a shortage of housing in Litzmannstadt.¹⁰⁸ On 10 June 1942, he officially left the UWZ and was transferred to his new post as a camp commander in Norway.¹⁰⁹ Krumei had prevailed. This likely also influenced the outcome of the investigation.

102 IPN GK 69/229, Letter from Mollenhauer to Krumei, 3 April 1942, 51.

103 IPN GK 69/212, Letter from Broszeit to Krumei, 8 December 1941, 75–77.

104 IPN GK 69/229, Note from Krumei regarding Witthinrich, 18 April 1942, 55.

105 BArch R 9361-III/538242, Copy of a letter from Witthinrich to the SS-Hauptamt, 2 May 1942, 729.

106 IPN GK 69/204, Letter from Arthur Harder to Krumei, 17 July 1941, 2.

107 IPN GK 69/229, Letter from Krumei to IdS Damzog, 15 April 1942, 54.

108 IPN GK 69/229, Letter from Krumei to Witthinrich, 5 June 1942, 61.

109 BArch R 9361-III/564226, Lebenslauf Witthinrichs, 9 December 1944, 626.

Closing the Investigation

On 15 May 1942, the investigating IdS prepared a final report in which Krumei was given a favourable reference.¹¹⁰ A month later, the RSHA confirmed these positive statements about Krumei and emphasised that, in contrast, Witthinrich gave the “impression of a very stubborn and self-righteous person”.¹¹¹ The investigation was not yet concluded, but the initiation of criminal proceedings was deemed unlikely.¹¹² In August, the matter was taken over as a disciplinary case by I D 2 (*SS-Disziplinarsachen*) of the RSHA. It seems that a conversation with the head of the UWZ in Posen, Rolf-Heinz Höppner, about Krumei and Witthinrich was decisive for this. Krumei and Höppner’s friendly relationship might have influenced this assessment:

[Höppner] gave SS-Obersturmbannführer Krumei the best possible reference, describing him as a very decent character. Allegedly, Krumei was even said to be almost too decent. In contrast, SS-Sturmbannführer Höppner characterised SS-Obersturmführer Witthinrich very poorly. He also believed that Witthinrich had failed in terms of his work performance during his time in Litzmannstadt.¹¹³

Krumei had previously been described as a “reliable Nazi, with a clear and mature judgment”.¹¹⁴ Apart from the seemingly friendly relations with the investigating IdS as well as his superior Höppner, the SS authorities must have been more likely to believe the testimony of an SS leader who was consistently deemed ideologically steadfast and who had made his mark on deportation policy.¹¹⁵ Thus, in October 1942, only Witthinrich’s accusations regarding the lack of supervision in the case of Lorenz’s and Broszeit’s relationship were taken into account:

[f]rom our perspective, he should have intervened officially under all circumstances to protect the reputation of the Security Police and the SD. His excuses cannot absolve him, as such cohabitation is entirely unacceptable, even from the standpoint of a pending divorce.¹¹⁶

Otherwise, there was no indication that Krumei had “behaved incorrectly in any way”. Since Krumei was assessed as “very good on the job” and “almost too honourable”, he was only formally reprimanded by I D 2 (*SS-Disziplinarsachen*) of the RSHA.¹¹⁷ On 21 April 1943, the disciplinary penalty was removed from his record.¹¹⁸ Krumei had managed to solidify his position and eliminate Witthinrich as a rival. Krumei was thus able to rally the remaining UWZ men even more closely behind him – a talent for which he had already been praised at the beginning of his career.¹¹⁹

[h]e has excelled in the particularly challenging task of aligning the SS members, who were summoned and assigned from various departments, in a unified manner. It is especially noteworthy that Krumei managed to main-

110 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from ID 2 RSHA to Reisch, August 1942, 720.

111 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from RSHA to IdS Damzog, 19 June 1942, 724.

112 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from RSHA to RKF, 1 July 1942, 726.

113 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from ID 2 RSHA to Reisch, August 1942, 720.

114 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Evaluation report, 842.

115 IPN GK 69/20, Letter from Krumei to Eichmann regarding “Aktion Saybusch”, 16 September 1940, 92.

116 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Template by ID 2 RSHA, 23 September 1942, 704.

117 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from ID 2 to RKF, 1 October 1942, 711. Other UWZ men in closer contact with Lorenz were also acquitted of any guilt because the department head had not acted as a role model. BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from ID 1 regarding Haarbrückner, 21 December 1942.

118 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Internal note from ID, 24 June 1943, 690.

119 BACh R 9361-III/538242, Letter from SS-Oberabschnitt Nordsee to SS-Abschnitt XIV, 870.

tain a very good camaraderie with his men despite the very difficult working conditions and that he always fully committed himself to their well-being.¹²⁰

It can be assumed that the men did not always act correctly. However, from then on, misconduct no longer became known to the outside world. Krumei, who was able to consolidate his position within the UWZ, was subsequently able to rise further and became one of the central perpetrators of the Holocaust. Alongside other UWZ men loyal to him, he was responsible for the deportation of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz.¹²¹

Conclusion

The investigative reports and (secret) accounts of all UWZ members must of course be problematised as source material that is not necessarily reliable. Most reports either served the purpose of denying one's own wrongdoing or accusing someone else of misconduct. However, even if the motivation for all these accusations by various members of the department may often have been of a personal nature, it can still be assumed that they were not all completely made up. The sources can still provide insight into the everyday life of the UWZ men. As mentioned in multiple statements, SS leaders in the East, in this case in the UWZ, were often more or less forced to be in close contact with each other also after working hours. Friendships and fall-outs were common. Both fraudulent as well as abusive behaviour also seem to have been common, even if the latter especially is only mentioned in passing in the reports discussed above. Witthinrich accused Lorenz, Schlag, and to a certain extent Mollenhauer of (forced) sexual relations with Polish women. Even though he emphasized "Rassenschande" over the fact that Lorenz had possibly raped women from the UWZ camp, it still makes clear how prevalent sexual abuse – a topic often not talked about in survivor testimonies – must have been. Other forms of physical violence, such as Krumei torturing a Polish camp elder to get information on Witthinrich, is also mentioned only in passing. The picture that emerges is one of general corruption and abuse.

The Lorenz case clearly illustrates the opportunities that opened up for German occupation officials who were deployed in the East. Lorenz, whose problematic financial situation, past trickery, and extramarital affairs had already been the subject of another investigation, seemed to be able to display the same behaviour with (temporary) impunity in Litzmannstadt. It was only Witthinrich's denunciation, accusing him of relations with Polish women, that triggered an investigation by the Gestapo in Litzmannstadt and then by the RSHA. However, the close personal relationships between various SS leaders (including Witthinrich) and Lorenz, as well as the various accusations against Krumei and Witthinrich in particular, suggest that Lorenz did not act alone or unnoticed. The assertions of Lorenz's colleagues that they knew nothing of his financial problems or the embezzlement must be questioned, at least with regard to the fact that his superior, Krumei, was aware of his previous history. As violence and fraud seem to have been widespread, yet no SS investigation was previously conducted, it must be assumed that the UWZ men covered up each other's wrongdoings or looked the other way. Those who did not abide by the rules of

120 BAArch R 9361-III/538242, Letter from Ehlich to the head of SS-Abschnitt XIV, 9 August 1943, 935–936.

121 Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Verbrechen 1939–1945* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2022), 103–104; DÖW 23675/4, Decision in the criminal case against Krumei and Hunsche, 396. See also Cesarani, *Eichmann*.

this community were eliminated, as the examples of Witthinrich and Ismer show. Witthinrich especially incurred the wrath of his comrades through his complaint to a higher authority. This led to accusations against him. Thus, it was not those who violated SS rules by, for example, having extramarital relationships who were automatically transferred or sanctioned, but those who exposed this community built upon abuse and self-enrichment.

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