

Mark Lewis

“Wheels and Cogs”

Why Viennese Policemen Guarded Deportation Transports, 1941–1943 Part 2

Abstract

Viennese policemen, as part of the German *Schutzpolizei* (uniformed police) after March 1938, complied with orders to guard deportation transports of Austrian Roma and Jews between 1941 and 1943. Previous theories about the German police have argued that they engaged in mass murder in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, due to peer pressure, obedience to authority, ideological training in police schools, or the influence of ideological careerist junior officers. This study, based on the personnel files of sixty-five policemen, 98 per cent of whom were hired before the Nazis came to power, contests those theories. It proposes a four-stage, time-dependent hypothesis about why police obeyed orders. The first three stages were covered in the first half of the article, which appeared in volume 11, number 2, of S.I.M.O.N. The article in this issue begins with the fourth stage. During the Second World War, the police overcame cognitive dissonance about deporting people by justifying their actions to themselves: guard duty was part of their job as members of military police units, and the priority during the war was to protect Germans, not “racial outsiders” and foreigners. This part of the study describes the bureaucratic thoroughness with which the deportation trips were organised and how policemen were selected for guard duty. This section also analyses a post-war investigation in which some policemen claimed they had merely “acted under orders”. Similarities in their answers demonstrate that their responses were probably coordinated by higher police officials who wanted to exonerate the policemen and reinstate them on the force. Although some prior historiography has claimed that the Viennese police were totally transformed into a democratic institution after the Second World War, many policemen who had served as deportation guards were rehired. Their actions were swept under the rug because most policemen fitted limited legal definitions that did not connect them to the Nazi Party; some belonged to the SS Police, but disciplinary commissions ruled that this was distinct from voluntarily joining the SS. Furthermore, it appears that the new police administration viewed policemen as men who had suffered from bombardment and family hardship during the war and deserved to have their jobs back.

Part 1 of “Wheels and Cogs”: Why Viennese Policemen Guarded Deportation Transports, 1941–1943”, which appeared in volume 11, number 2, of S.I.M.O.N., explained the historiographical background and sources for this study of Viennese uniformed policemen (*Sicherheitswache*), who were integrated into the German uniformed police (*Schutzpolizei*) in March 1938. The study, based on sixty-five personnel records of policemen, revealed that 75 per cent of the group had joined the police during the First Republic. Then, the rule of law was supposed to be upheld and the police were supposed to be “non-political”, yet prejudices against Jews and Roma existed in police policy and in policemen’s worldviews. The study showed that only about a quarter of the police were Nazi Party members; therefore, the group as a whole did not execute orders because of pre-existing political affiliations or absolute

ideological conformity. Instead, other historical processes shaped both the policemen and the institution. The cultural views and police attitudes bequeathed by the Habsburg period formed a substrate. Police authority expanded during the late Republic and Austro-fascist periods. Nazi police officials, both Austrian and German, reshaped the Viennese police force in 1938 and 1939, according to policies that the Germans had implemented since 1933. Ideology was important, but Part 1 argued that the process of deploying this ideology and reshaping the policemen's view – setting conditions in which they could adapt to the system – occurred in stages.

This article deals with the fourth stage of the process, the formation of police battalions, the impact of the command structure, and how wartime policies privileged “racial Germans” over all others. The study then examines a post-war internal police investigation of policemen who guarded deportation transports, showing that several policemen may have been instructed by non-Nazi police officials to give similar exonerating statements, which would clear them for reinstatement and rebuild a force without criminal taint. The article concludes by explaining that post-war police officials did not want to weed out many officers who had participated, viewing them as “good Austrians” who had suffered under the Nazis, Allied bombardment, and wartime deployment.

In the fourth stage, the Nazis used the war context to begin deportations and assigned Viennese policemen to Reserve Police Battalions in the autumn of 1941. The decisions to begin deportations were made at higher levels, but the range of new police responsibilities to control forced labourers and supervise additional anti-Jewish restrictions set a pattern indicating that only “Aryans” were valuable. Putting police into the military battalions may have made it easier for some to overcome any cognitive dissonance about deporting people, but the Schutzpolizei established the tasks and the procedure. Policemen's post-war claims that they had to comply or would have been prosecuted by SS courts and then shot are disputable. There is currently no evidence that this happened.

The decision to use policemen to guard transports first appears locally during a Vienna meeting on 17 October 1939, when Eugen Becker, representing the city's economics office (*Wirtschaftsamt*), Adolf Eichmann of the Central Office for Jewish Emigration (*Zentralstelle für jüdische Auswanderung*), and Karl Ebner, the leader of the Jewish department in the Viennese Gestapo, met to discuss the city's role in helping to deport Jews to Poland. At that time, Becker, speaking on behalf of then Gauleiter Joseph Bürckel, said the city could make the Schutzpolizei available to guard transports. They were first used for this purpose when Jewish men were deported to Nisko, Poland, to build a labour camp in the General Government in October 1939.¹ However, the names of these policemen have not surfaced in historical records, so they could not be included in this study. After two transports to Nisko the *Zentralstelle* had to stop the deportations temporarily because the military needed the trains.² Still, Eichmann's organisational success in Vienna helped him obtain a pro-

1 Andrea Löw, ed., *Deutsches Reich und Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren. September 1939–September 1941*, vol. 3: *Die Verfolgung und Ermordung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–45* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2012), Doc. 24, 124–126; Hans Safrian, *Eichmann's Men*, trans. Ute Stargardt (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010 [German, 1993]), 55–57; Doron Rabinovici, *Eichmann's Jews: The Jewish Administration of Holocaust Vienna, 1938–1945*, trans. Nick Somers (Cambridge: Polity, 2011 [German, 2000]), 89–93. For in-depth research about the two Nisko transports, the relations between the *Zentralstelle* and the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde, the building of camps, and the fate of the deportees who fled to the Soviet zone and those who returned to Vienna, see Jonny Moser, *Nisko. Die ersten Judendeportationen* (Vienna: Edition Steinbauer, 2012).

2 Safrian, *Eichmann's Men*, 57.

motion to become the head of the deportation planning office in the Reich Security Main Office, Referat IV B 4, and he spent the rest of 1939 and part of 1940 working on projects to deport Jews from Germany, Austria, and Poland to Madagascar and then to the General Government. In the fall of 1940, the Governor and Nazi Party District Leader of Vienna (*Reichsstatthalter und Gauleiter*), Baldur von Schirach, lobbied Adolf Hitler to approve the deportation of Viennese Jews, which he did in a letter from 3 December 1940.³

Meanwhile, in Vienna, new regulations were introduced as a result of the war. The police had been given detailed instructions in May 1940 to supervise incoming Polish agricultural labourers, indicating an expansion of the forced-labour war economy.⁴ During the winter of 1941, police were required to make donations to help the families of the German army; they gave a total of 31.5 million RM, exceeding the previous year.⁵ Not only did this induce conformity to state policy, but it also brought the war home. In February 1941, the district chiefs of the non-uniformed criminal police were told to prepare for air attacks; they needed to ensure they had adequate ration cards for clothing, enough manpower for the hospitals and precincts, and were in contact with their Schutzpolizei counterparts.⁶ This was a further indication that Viennese society was on a war footing. Just prior to this, on 13 February 1941, the Zentralstelle and the Viennese Gestapo had told the Jewish community that they were resuming deportations. The Gestapo informed the regular police that Jews who tried to leave Vienna without a special certificate from the Zentralstelle must be arrested and taken to a collection camp (a school) on the Castellezgasse.⁷ Police then guarded five transports to the General Government in February and March 1941. The victims were Viennese Jews who were sent to rural towns and then murdered in the Operation Reinhard extermination centres in the summer of 1942. (This study does not include data on those policemen, because no reports with their names have surfaced).⁸ After the German Luftwaffe bombed Yugoslavia in April 1941, a large number of *Volksdeutsche* (ethnic German) refugees came to Vienna, and police were told to avoid punishing them if they violated passport rules.⁹ Thus, repeatedly, special wartime measures reinforced the idea that the police had to do their part so that German people – to the exclusion of others – were protected.

Furthermore, a stream of additional restrictions on Jews in autumn 1941 gave the police increased cause to take action against Jews. Starting on 19 September 1941, Jews older than six were required to wear an identifying star permanently sewn onto their exterior clothing; attaching it with safety pins (so it could be removed) or cov-

3 Ibid., 67–71.

4 Archiv der Landespolizeidirektion Wien (LPDW), Normalien 1940, II 3012/40/3, Der Polizeipräsident, Rundverfügung. Behandlung der im Reiche eingesetzten Zivilarbeiter- und Arbeiterinnen polnischen Volkstums, 25 May 1940.

5 LPDW, Normalien 1941, P 5031-41, Der Polizeipräsident, Rundverfügung. Tag der Deutschen Polizei; Anerkennung, 8 March 1941.

6 Ibid., Staatliche Kriminalpolizei, Kriminalpolizeileitstelle Wien, KPL. I B 181/1941, Aktenvermerk, 26 February 1941.

7 Ibid., Der Polizeipräsident, Rundverfügung, II 5220-41, Evakuierung von Juden aus Wien in das Generalgouvernement, 13 February 1941. The police president, Gotzmann, was transmitting an order (given in quotation marks) from Gestapo Chief Franz Huber. This is one of the key pieces of evidence that Thomas Mang uses to argue that Huber alone, not Eichmann's Zentralstelle, gave the green light for deportations to begin. Mang, "Gestapo-Leitstelle Wien, mein Name ist Huber". *Wer trug die lokale Verantwortung für den Mord an den Juden Wiens?*, (Münster: Lit, 2004), 251. This indeed seems to be the case, but it does not support Mang's view that Huber ordered the deportations without the higher authority of the RSHA.

8 Safrian, 67–71; Rabinovici, 102–107.

9 LPDW, Normalien 1941, II 3020/41, Flüchtlinge aus Jugoslawien; polizeiliche Erfassung, 8 April 1941.

ering it was subject to punishment by police.¹⁰ On 13 October, Jews were no longer allowed to use district health offices, except in Vienna's second district.¹¹ The police were also informed that the Jewish community could only buy soap and toiletries at a handful of shops; presumably the police would ensure that they shopped nowhere else.¹² At the same time, police were instructed that they should increase their surveillance of telephone booths and were ordered to treat vandals as saboteurs.¹³ By the time the deportations began in November 1941, the police were fully involved in guarding a society that was supposed to be protected from saboteurs, criminals, Roma, and Jews.

In August 1941, policemen were mustered into Reserve Police Battalions and then trained in early 1942 at Schönbrunn, Wiener Neudorf, or the military shooting range at Kagran.¹⁴ The battalions were divided into different companies, and those that trained at Kagran were called the Reserve Police Battalion for Special Use (*Reserve Polizei Bataillon zur besonderen Verwendung*).¹⁵ The key decision to use police to guard Jews deported from the Reich (including Austria) and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia came on 4 October 1941, when Kurt Daluege, the chief of the *Ordnungspolizei* (Order Police), and Reinhard Heydrich, the chief of the *Sicherheitspolizei* (Security Police), agreed that the *Ordnungspolizei* (encompassing the *Schutzpolizei*) would provide the manpower to guard the transports.¹⁶ At this point the main waves of transports began (with the first of twenty trains arriving at the station near Łódź on 16 October 1941),¹⁷ about two to three months after policemen

10 This was required for: registered members of the Jewish community in Vienna; so-called "Geltungsjuden" who, according to the Nuremberg Racial Laws, had one Jewish and one "Aryan" parent; and persons legally defined as Jews but who had converted to a different religion or did not belong to any religious community. Only persons in "privileged mixed marriages" were exempt. See Dieter J. Hecht and Michaela Raggam-Blesch, "Der Weg in die Vernichtung begann mitten in der Stadt. Sammellager und Deportationen aus Wien 1941/42", in Dieter J. Hecht, Michaela Raggam-Blesch, and Heidemarie Uhl, eds., *Letzte Orte. Die Wiener Sammellager und die Deportationen 1941/42* (Vienna: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2019), 34–38, and Rabinovici, *Eichmann's Jews: The Jewish Administration of Holocaust Vienna, 1938–1945*, 109–110.

11 LPDW, Normalien 1941, II 3020/41, Errichtung einer amtsärztlichen Dienststelle für Juden, 13 October 1941.

12 Ibid., IV 10.00-41, Einkaufsregelung für Juden, 22 October 1941.

13 Ibid., Kommando der Schutzpolizei, Ia 6210/41, Beschädigung von Münz-Fernsprechern.

14 Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission statements: LPDW, Personalakten: B., Anton, St.Nr.669/19 (9/57), Niederschrift, 7 September 1946; H. IV, Anton, St.Nr.857/20 (94/57), 9 September 1946; N., Oskar, St.Nr.398/28 (131/62), 25 September 1946. Anton B. admitted to guarding a Jewish transport to Riga in February 1942; so did Anton H., who also stated that he guarded another transport (one wagon attached to a regular train) to Theresienstadt in 1942, though the date was probably 30 March 1943. See Mark Lewis, "Wheels and Cogs": Why Viennese Policemen Guarded Deportation Transports, 1941–1943 (Part 1), *S:I.M.O.N. – Shoah: Intervention. Methods. DocumentatiON*, 11, no. 2 (2024): 27–28, n. 92. Oskar N. denied guarding any transports, and because the YVA records only show he was assigned to the Stettin transport, he was not counted as a participant in this study. Not everyone followed the same training pattern as these three. Albin K. stated that he was assigned to the 16th District (Schmelz) until the Nazi takeover. Next, he was assigned to the 4. Hundertschaft in the Marokkanerkaserne, which was sent to Mährische Kromau for the invasion of the Sudetenland. This lasted four weeks, then they returned to Vienna. The Hundertschaft was dissolved and they went back to their regular duties. He testified that "[i]n August 1941 a Police Reserve Battalion was assembled in the Schedilstraße and militarily trained. This Battalion went to Kagran in January 1942 and received the name Watch-Battalion Vienna for special use (Wach-Baon Wien z.b.V.) I was assigned to this battalion until August 1942." He guarded a Jewish transport to Kovno on 23 November 1941, which he admitted to the Überprüfungskommission, though he gave the incorrect date of December 1941 (LPDW, Personalakt K., Albin, St. Nr.848/36 (148/61), Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 18 September 1946). Various typists typed "Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission" with different spacing. This paper has standardised this.

15 Ibid.

16 Yad Vashem Archives, O.51, Nazi Documentation, File No. 88, Item No. 36855621 [hereafter YVA], Folio 6, Chef der Ordnungspolizei, Schnellbrief. Evakuierungen von Juden aus dem Altreich und dem Protektorat, Kdo. g 2 (01) Nr.514/41 (g), 4 October 1941.

17 Bertrand Perz, "Wiener Juden und Jüdinnen im Getto Litzmannstadt", in *Post 41. Berichte aus dem Getto Litzmannstadt – Ein Gedenkbuch*, eds. Angelika Brechelmacher, Bertrand Perz, and Regina Wonisch (Vienna: Mandelbaum Verlag, 2015), 19, 64.

were assigned to Police Battalions. Franz Butenop, a police inspector from Hamburg who became the chief of staff for the Viennese Schutzpolizei in 1938 – and whose role in these operations has not been thoroughly investigated –¹⁸ issued instructions on 24 October 1941 for five transports of Roma (5,000 persons) to the Litzmannstadt/Łódź ghetto, from Mattersburg, Fürstenfeld, and Pinkafeld, requiring 100 policemen and five higher-ranking police officers from Reserve Police Battalion 172.¹⁹ A list of twenty-one policemen assigned to the transport of 4 November 1941 exists; these men rounded up and deported Roma from the Lackenbach camp near Mattersburg.²⁰ I located personnel records for five.²¹ Four stated they had been in the Reserve Police Battalion for Special Use and had trained at Kagran.²² None were Nazis, and all except one were former soldiers in the Austrian Army (*Bundesheer*) who had joined the police relatively late – in 1935 or 1936.²³ Whether their prior military training and habituation to command made them appropriate for the Roma transport remains a matter of speculation. A few of them also guarded a Jewish transport to Kovno, indicating that successful completion of the Roma transport made them reliable for the next one (Jews).²⁴ However, considering the group of all policemen involved in transports, fifty-one were not in the *Bundesheer*, and all but two had joined the Viennese uniformed police before 1930 (before the Austro-fascist period). Therefore, one cannot readily conclude that they complied with orders due to socialization in a military structure; for those who had been in the First World War, that was more than twenty years before. Even if one places great weight on the police battalion routine of military training and the possibility of foreign military deployment (two factors that differentiated their lives from regular police duties), they still had been shaped by their home and family life, expectations about male authority, and years of service in a police force that had first limited civil liberties and then enforced racial exclusion.

18 Franz Butenop (born 1896 in Malente-Greismühlen, Germany) was a First World War veteran who joined the Hamburg Schutzpolizei in 1919 and became an inspector of the Ordnungspolizei in Hamburg in 1937. He was transferred to Vienna effective 1 June 1938. Bundesarchiv (Berlin-Lichterfelde), VBS 1069 (R 19)/ZB 0960 A. 01. Personalakte des Obersten der Schutzpolizei, Pol.O-Kdo.P II(2a) But VI 78b, 7 November 1938; O.-Kdo.P II (2a)56 b Nr. 29, 16 May 1938.

19 YVA Folio 4, Kommando der Schutzpolizei, 1a 6260/Zig./Nr.369/41 (g), 24 October 1941.

20 Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes [DÖW] 10 501-c. The document itself is undated but names the policemen assigned to the 4 November 1941 transport. See also Alfred B. Gottwaldt and Diana Schulle, *Die "Judendeportationen" aus dem Deutschen Reich von 1941–1945: Eine kommentierte Chronologie* (Wiesbaden: Marix, 2005), 52–55, 63–64.

21 See the Ref.IV Ueberprüfungskommission statements in their personnel files: G., Josef, St.Nr.619/36 (15/64), Niederschrift, 11 September 1946; P., Josef, St.Nr.797/36 (160/65), Niederschrift, 10 September 1946; S., Thomas, St.Nr.58/36 (116/69), Niederschrift, 10 September 1946; and W. Rudolf, St.Nr.67/36 (226/1969), Niederschrift, 10 September 1946. Josef G., Josef P., and Thomas S. admitted to guarding Jewish transports; Rudolf W. admitted to guarding a Roma transport. Franz N., St.Nr.286/21 (479/52), was never questioned, but Josef G. and Josef P. named him as a witness regarding their involvement in a Jewish transport to Kovno.

22 The same four who gave statements.

23 The exception was Franz N., who joined the police in 1921.

24 The date that policemen in this study guarded a transport to Kovno is not completely clear. Four policemen told the post-war examining commission that they had guarded a Jewish transport to Kovno, but the dates they gave (three stated February 1942, one stated December 1941) do not correspond to the date that Gottwaldt and Schulle said was the sole transport from Vienna to Kovno, on 23 November 1941 (carrying 995 Austrian Jews). Gottwaldt and Schulle report that this was part of a group of five transports originally scheduled for Riga but were rerouted at the Gestapo's request to Kovno. It is possible the policemen misremembered or used these dates to coordinate their stories, a point addressed later in this article. Compare LPDW, Personalakt G. III, Josef, St.Nr.619/36 (15/64), Polizeidirektion Wien, Generalinspektorat der Sicherheitswache, Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 18 September 1946; K., Albin, St.Nr.848/36 (148/61), Niederschrift, 18 September 1946; P., Josef, St.Nr.797/36 (160/65), Niederschrift, 10 September 1946; S., Thomas, St.Nr.58-36 (116/69), Niederschrift, 10 September 1946, with Gottwaldt and Schulle, *Die "Judendeportationen" aus dem Deutschen Reich von 1941–1945*, 98–100, 107–108.

The police command structure established the process for the deportations; this should be recognised, because it was not an entirely the Zentralstelle or the Gestapo's operation.²⁵ The police procedure became so regularised that it operated without constant supervision from the police president's office, proven by the fact that the second police president, Leo Gotzmann, was on medical leave for about five weeks in April and May 1942 while the deportations were in full swing.²⁶ The Schutzpolizei received its orders from the Inspector of the Ordnungspolizei in Austria (Ernst Kaltenbrunner), but he was simply transmitting orders that came from Daluge.²⁷ In Vienna, Butenop issued instructions containing the dates of upcoming transports, which police companies would be used, and the equipment and weapons the police should bring. We have these instructions for November 1941 and for many transports in 1942 and 1943.²⁸ After the Romani transports of October–November 1941, Butenop or his staff instructed that Reserve Police Companies East, West, and South handle the Jewish transports of 1942, and that Police Watch Battalion I handle the 1943 transports.

The police companies selected the transport leaders and the policemen who would guard the transports. The police were instructed to report to the train stations (the Aspangbahnhof in 1941 and 1942, and the Nordbahnhof in 1943), where they took custody of the deportees from the Zentralstelle; Eichmann and his deputy Alois Brunner perfected the system of registering Jews, stealing their property, and rounding them up in temporary facilities in Vienna.²⁹ Then, the police transport leader telephoned the SS officer at the Zentralstelle to confirm that the deportation was ready. Orders from 1942 and 1943 note that this was either Alois Brunner or Ernst Girzick.³⁰ The policemen were instructed to guard the transport until its final destination, when they would transfer the human cargo to the Security Police. In the orders of March 1942 onwards, they were instructed to make immediate use of their weapons (pistols and carbine rifles) in case Jews attempted to escape. For the 1942 transports, a Jewish person (marked by an armband) was designated as the *Transportleiter* (not really a "leader", as the name suggests, but a Jewish liaison), and two Jewish doctors were to accompany each transport. These were not specified for the 1943 transports, which were smaller.³¹ Everything was rationally planned and bureaucratically recorded: schedules, personnel assignments, financial accounting, and post-deportation reports.³²

25 Mark Lewis, "Continuity and Change in the Vienna Police Force, 1914–1945. Part 2 [1933–45]", *S:I.M.O.N. – Shoah: Intervention. Methods. DocumentatiON*, 7, no. 1 (2020): 68–70.

26 Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Archiv der Republik, Reichsstatthalterei Wien, Referat Ia-S Pol (Schutzpolizei), 2508/771/42, K. 551.

27 Peter R. Black, *Ernst Kaltenbrunner: Ideological Soldier of the Third Reich* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 106–112.

28 YVA Folio 4, Kommando der Schutzpolizei, Ia 6260/Zig./Nr.369/41 (g.), Betr.: Gestellung von Transportkommandos, 24 October 1941; Folio 8, Kommando der Schutzpolizei, Ia 6260/42, Betr.: Gestellung von Transportkommandos, 20 March 1942; Folio 93, Kommando der Schutzpolizei, Ia 6260/43, Betr.: Gestellung von Transportkommandos, 4 January 1943.

29 Safrian, *Eichmann's Men*, 14–45, 72–90, 118–130; Rabinovici, *Eichmann's Jews. The Jewish Administration of Holocaust Vienna, 1938–1945*, 102–112. Brunner developed the system of forcibly removing Jews from their homes ("Aushebung"), requiring that the IKG provide 400–500 Jewish helpers (called "Ordner") who went house to house, preventing persons on deportation lists from escaping, helping them pack, and accompanying them to the collection camps in Vienna. See Hecht and Raggam-Blesch, "Der Weg in die Vernichtung", 43–48.

30 YVA Folio 36, Kdo.d.Sch. Nr. 76 3/6 1620; YVA Folio 93.

31 Compare YVA Folio 8 with Folio 33.

32 For the reports, see YVA Folio 15, 95. Pol.Revier, Erfahrungsbericht über durchgeführten Judentransports, 4 May 1942 [Jewish transport to Włodawa, 27 April 1942]; YVA Folio 27, 95. Pol.Revier, Erfahrungsbericht über durchgeführten Evakuierungstransport (Juden), 16 May 1942 [Jewish transport to Minsk, 6 May 1942]; YVA Folio 42, 152. Polizeirevier, Erfahrungsbericht, Betr.: Transportkommando für den Judentransport, Wien-Aspangbahnhof nach Sobibor am 14.6.1942 [Jewish transport to Sobibor, 14 June 1942]; YVA Folio 90, 90.Pol.Revier, 6260, Betr.: Erfahrungsbericht über durchgeführten Judentransport, 19 October 1942 [Jewish transport to Minsk, 5 October 1942].

Orders were given in advance, not on the day of the mission, as one policeman claimed in 1946.³³ This is proven by the fact that transport leaders were given cash advances for travel expenses before the trip; so were other policemen.³⁴ Additionally, Butenop's orders specified the required weapons, flashlights, and rations; it is unlikely that this would have been left to the last minute for a multi-day journey. Furthermore, the police transport leaders received their authorisation documents in advance, which they showed to border guards and military personnel during the trip. In a very interesting case, after the war, a family which was allowed to move into the apartment of Josef H., a transport leader, found his documents in the basement. They show that he led six policemen to guard a "Jewish evacuation transport" to the ghetto in Theresienstadt on 13 August 1942; fifteen policemen to guard a "Jewish evacuation transport" to the "occupied eastern territory" on 31 August 1942; and again six policemen to guard a "Jewish evacuation transport" to Theresienstadt on 10 September 1942.³⁵

Starting in March 1942, Butenop specified that a transport leader should be a *Revier Leutnant* (a precinct lieutenant) and should come from the Reserve Police Battalion for Special Use. Furthermore, he ordered that they should have experience leading a prior transport.³⁶ Personnel files and accounting records for seven transport leaders show that many led multiple transports. Six were ardent Nazi Party members (and a seventh, Johann Peter II, probably was also, since he led multiple transports and had a higher rank).³⁷ This suggests that the Schutzpolizei wanted transport leaders who were experienced policemen, possessed Nazi credentials, and would ensure the mission was completed. Virtually all the transport leaders belonged to an older generation, born between 1894 and 1900; they had joined the police between 1918 and 1923, during the early First Republic, and had therefore spent around two decades in the force (except for one).³⁸ Therefore, most do not fit the profile that Michael Wildt describes for the Reich Security Main Office administrators and which Ian Rich applied in his analysis of the two German Reserve Police Battal-

33 LPDW, Personalakt J. I., Alois, St.Nr.217/23, Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 7 September 1946. He was in Pol. Battalion 172 and admitted to guarding a transport to Riga.

34 YVA 51/88/36855621 is filled with these. For example, Folios 33–35 show the amounts that Josef F. I, Josef B., and Josef H. IV were advanced for a transport to Minsk on 27 May 1942, how much they claimed, and how much they needed to be reimbursed.

35 See Lewis, "Wheels and Cogs", Part I, n. 60, concerning his documents.

36 YVA Folio 8.

37 The Nazis were Josef H. (1900–?), Otto M. (1897–1983), Johann Pflamitzer (1902–?), Robert R. (1895, disappeared 1944/45), Johann S. II (1895–?), and Josef T. (1907–1978). Johann Peter II (1894–1944) was likely a Nazi, because he led five transports; it is doubtful that the Schutzpolizei would have entrusted a non-Nazi for these missions. None of the five who survived the war was reinstated, but this was because they had belonged to the Nazi Party after March 1938 or had been convicted by a Volksgericht of having been an illegal Nazi. Some processes of dismissal were very long, stretching into the mid-1950s. None was investigated for having led transports; State Police and prosecutors may not have known. The policemen's post-war statements and their witnesses should be regarded sceptically, because they were trying to keep their jobs and avoid criminal prosecution. For Otto M., see LPDW, Personalakt M., Otto, St.Nr.291/18(253/47), Grundblatt; Lebenslauf 22 October 1945; YVA Folio 109, 113–114; Personalakt, Abschrift des Gau-Aktes Nr. 93.155; Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv (WStLA), 2.7.1.4. Gauakten, Gaukartei G 303-14/28, K1/213; Personalakt, Vg 11f Vr 4324/27 Hv 154/48 (Abschrift), Urteil, 22 October 1948. For Pflamitzer, see YVA Folios 52, 54, 111, 112; WStLA, Volksgericht A1, Strafsache gegen Swinger, Heinrich und Pflamitzer, Johann, Vg 8e Vr 543/55, Niederschrift, Generalinspektorat der Sicherheitswache, 16 April 1947. For Robert R., see YVA Folios 65–66, 76–81, 88–89; LPDW, Personalakt R., Robert, St.Nr.218/44, Dienstzettel an das BfI-Abtg. 2, R. [anonymised], Politische Überprüfung wegen Besoldung, 27 May 1947; Ref.IV.Besoldung, Aktenvermerk, 19 July 1945; Niederschrift, Margarete R., 2 August 1949; Niederschrift, Margarete R., 25 November 1950). For Johann S. II, see WStLA, Gaukartei G 303-13/31: K1/292; LPDW, Personalakt S. II., Johann, St.Nr. 244/46, Vg 1c Vr 6338/46, Urteil, 22 January 1947 (Abschrift); YVA Folios 37–40. For Peter II, see LPDW, Personalakt Peter II, Johann, St.Nr. 276/45 (231/1918), Kommando der Schutzpolizei, 2 F- 3530/26.6, 27 June 1944.

38 This was Josef T. (1907–1978); see Lewis, "Wheels and Cogs", Part I, 21, n. 60.

ions involved in murder operations in Ukraine.³⁹ The Viennese transport leaders were not young, career-climbing SS officers in their twenties; they were trained, experienced policemen who had been promoted during the First Republic, joined the Nazi Party (usually before 1938), and had adapted to the Austro-fascist and Nazi regimes. Some were definitely ideologically motivated, but these were just the transport leaders, not the six to twenty subordinates under them. No post-war records cover any information about speeches or verbal instructions the policemen received, so we do not know what influence the transport leaders had on the other men.

Although the Schutzpolizei's records of assignments and finances only cover a portion of the transports, the policemen in this study guarded a significant number of transports (more than half of the mass transports) and participated in most of the major waves. This indicates how routine this process became, and how integral the police were to the overall mechanism. Table 1 shows the transports which these policemen guarded. The number assigned to the transports corresponds to the numbers used by Jonny Moser in his tables, allowing one to compare this table to his (it therefore represents a subset of the overall Austrian transports).⁴⁰ Additionally, Table 1 lists the departure dates, the number of deportees, the destination, and the wave of these deportations. The policemen in this study guarded thirty-five Jewish transports (around half of the total), and one "Gypsy transport" (out of five).

Viennese policemen guarded deportations of Jews to the "Reichskommissariat Ostland" (Kovno, Riga, and Minsk), part of the second wave of deportations from November 1941 to February 1942. These destinations were chosen because officials in Warthegau (where Łódź ghetto was located) rejected allowing any more Jews and Roma to come there. All told, there were seven trains to Minsk, five transports rerouted to Kovno, and twenty to Riga.⁴¹ However, there are only records for policemen who participated in two of these transports.⁴²

The police continued their actions during the deportations of Jews to the General Government (Izbica, Włodawa, and Sobibor), part of the third wave from March 1942 to July 1942. This massive wave of deportations (forty-three transports from the Greater Reich as a whole, each comprised of approximately 1,000 people) represents the fulfilment of a plan worked out by Eichmann and his Department IV B 4 in the Reich Security Main Office, coordinating the deportation and extermination of European Jewry with Gestapo officials, railway officials, Higher SS and Police Leaders, and the Ordnungspolizei. Eichmann established the parameters for the plan after the Wannsee Conference, held in January 1942. The main targets of the Viennese deportations were Austrian Jews under sixty-five, though stateless Jews and foreign Jews from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were also deported, despite the fact that Eichmann's instructions said foreign Jews were to be excluded.⁴³

39 Ian Rich, *Holocaust Perpetrators of the German Police Battalions: The Mass Murder of Jewish Civilians, 1940–1942* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 10–32; Michael Wildt, *An Uncompromising Generation: The Nazi Leadership of the Reich Security Main Office*, trans. Tom Lampert (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

40 Jonny Moser, "Österreich", in *Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Wolfgang Benz, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996), 76–86, Tables 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4.

41 Gottwaldt and Schulle, *Die "Judendeportationen" aus dem Deutschen Reich von 1941–1945*, 84–85.

42 Regarding the date of the Kovno transport, see n. 24.

43 See Gottwaldt and Schulle, *Die "Judendeportationen" aus dem Deutschen Reich von 1941–1945*, 137–159, 192; Steffen Hängs, *Das Transitghetto Izbica im System des Holocaust* (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2018), 264–270. YVA Folio 13, which states that Johann Peter II and Johann F. led a Jewish transport to Riga on 23 March 1942, gives a destination that was later changed. The financial record directly below it, balancing the amount the two men were paid in advance for the trip versus what they actually spent, lists the destination as Izbicia (Izbica).

Table 1: Deportations with Known Policemen (Subset of all Deportations)

Departure Number from Vienna	Date	Destination	Number of Deportees**	Phase (Reich-wide perspective)
Not listed	04.11.1941	Łódz (Litzmannstadt)	Roma (1,000)	One of five Roma transports, part of 1 st wave, including 20 Jewish transports from important cities in the Reich (Germany and Austria), October–November 1941
11	23.11.1941?	Kovno	Jews (995)	2 nd wave, heading to Reichskommissariat Ostland, 32–33 transports, November 1941–February 1942
16	06.02.1942	Riga	Jews (997)	2 nd wave, November 1941–February 1942
17	09.04.1942	Izbica	Jews (998)	3 rd wave, 45,000 Jews from the Greater Reich (including Vienna and the Protectorate), sent to the eastern border of the General-Government and to the Warsaw ghetto, March–July 1942
18	27.04.1942	Włodawa	Jews (998)	3 rd wave, March–July 1942
19	06.05.1942	Minsk	Jews (994)	Minsk wave, 17 transports of Jews from the Greater German Reich (primarily from Vienna and Theresienstadt) to Minsk and Maly Trostinec, May–September 1942
Not listed	05.08.1942	Stettin	Not people? Supplies or material?	
20	12.05.1942	Izbica	Jews (1,001)	3 rd wave, March–July 1942
21	15.05.1942	Izbica	Jews (1,006)	3 rd wave, March–July 1942
22	20.05.1942	Minsk	Jews (986)	Minsk wave, May–September 1942
23	27.05.1942	Minsk	Jews (981)	Minsk wave, May–September 1942
25	05.06.1942	“Ostgebiet” (Izbica/Sobibor)	Jews (1,001)	3 rd wave, March–July 1942
27	14.06.1942	Sobibor (originally Izbica)	Jews (996)	3 rd wave, last transport from Vienna for this wave
30	10.07.1942	Theresienstadt	Jews (993)	Theresienstadt transports (incoming) in the summer of 1942, following the deportation of Jews from the Protectorate to this transit camp and then outgoing transports to eastern ghettos, camps, extermination centres
31	14.07.1942	Theresienstadt	Jews (988)	Theresienstadt transports, summer 1942
32	17.07.1942	Auschwitz	Jews (995)	First transport to Auschwitz from Vienna
34	28.07.1942	Theresienstadt	Jews (988)	Theresienstadt transports, summer 1942
35	13.08.1942	Theresienstadt	Jews (997)	Theresienstadt transports, summer 1942
36	17.08.1942	Minsk-Maly Trostinec	Jews (1,003)	Minsk wave, May–September 1942
37	20.08.1942	Theresienstadt	Jews (997)	Theresienstadt transports, summer 1942
39	31.08.1942	Maly Trostinec	Jews (967)	Minsk wave, May–September 1942

* Jonny Moser, “Österreich”, in *Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der Jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 76–86, Tables 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4.

** The numbers of Jewish victims come from Moser’s calculations of those actually deported, except for the victims from Macedonia and Thrace, which come from the Yad Vashem database. That database lists the number of persons rounded up in each town and how many arrived at Treblinka. There is a range of minimum and maximum victims for Kavalla, Xanthe, Komotini, and Alexandroupolis, which is why the total figure is from 4043 to 4272.

Departure Number from Vienna	Date	Destination	Number of Deportees**	Phase (Reich-wide perspective)
40	10.09.1942	Theresienstadt	Jews (990)	Theresienstadt transports, Part II, August–October 1942. After transport on 8–9 October 1942 (the last of 13 large transports from Vienna), only 8,000 Jews were left, either in mixed marriages or regarded as “Geltungsjuden” under the law
42	14.09.1942	Ostgebiet (Minsk)	Jews (992)	Minsk wave, May–September 1942
42	24.09.1942	Theresienstadt	Jews (1,287)	Theresienstadt transports, Part II, August–October 1942
43	01.10.1942	Theresienstadt	Jews (1,290)	Theresienstadt transports, Part II, August–October 1942
44	05.10.1942	Minsk	Jews (544)	Minsk wave, May–September 1942
46a	05.01.1943	Theresienstadt	Jews (100)	Smaller transports to Theresienstadt, November 1942–June 1943
46b	08.01.1943	Theresienstadt	Jews (101)	Smaller transports to Theresienstadt, November 1942–June 1943
47c	11.01.1943	Theresienstadt	Jews (100)	Smaller transports to Theresienstadt, November 1942–June 1943
47a(A)	03.03.1943	Auschwitz	Jews (75)	Phase of deportations to Auschwitz, with an important change in the rules: Jews working in war-essential industries were now included
Not listed	25.03.1943	Malkinia (Treblinka)	Jews from Macedonia and Thrace (4,043–4,272 total)	Bulgarian police transferred Macedonian and Thracian Jews to Viennese police
Not listed	26.03.1943	Malkinia (Treblinka)	Jews from Macedonia and Thrace	Bulgarian police transferred Macedonian and Thracian Jews to Viennese police
Not listed	28.03.1943	Malkinia (Treblinka)	Jews from Macedonia and Thrace	Bulgarian police transferred Macedonian and Thracian Jews to Viennese police
47b(B)	31.03.1943	Auschwitz	Jews (85)	Auschwitz transport as above, including Jews working in war industries. Transport included 49 Romanian Jews
46f	30.03.1943	Theresienstadt	Jews (101) ('Zigeuner' is a mistake in the Schutzpolizei records)	Smaller transports to Theresienstadt, November 1942–June 1943
46g	01.04.1943	Theresienstadt	Jews (72)	Smaller transports to Theresienstadt, November 1942–June 1943
46i	24.06.1943	Theresienstadt	Jews (151)	Smaller transports to Theresienstadt, November 1942–June 1943

* Jonny Moser, “Österreich”, in *Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der Jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, ed. Wolfgang Benz (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 76–86, Tables 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4.

** The numbers of Jewish victims come from Moser’s calculations of those actually deported, except for the victims from Macedonia and Thrace, which come from the Yad Vashem database. That database lists the number of persons rounded up in each town and how many arrived at Treblinka. There is a range of minimum and maximum victims for Kavalla, Xanthe, Komotini, and Alexandroupolis, which is why the total figure is from 4043 to 4272.

As this wave was occurring, there was also a set of deportations of Jews to Minsk and Maly Trostinec (one in late November 1941, the rest from May to October 1942). This wave of seventeen transports mainly departed from Vienna and Theresienstadt, the latter housing elderly people and serving as a clean, model camp that the Nazis could show to the world.⁴⁴ By this point, the Viennese police had become experienced in handling these transports; some of the same officers were assigned the job multiple times.⁴⁵

Additionally, the Viennese police guarded large-capacity deportations of Jews to Theresienstadt (each around 1,000 persons, leaving Vienna from June 1942 to October 1942). There were about thirty-one of these altogether (plus four smaller capacity ones). Police included in this study were involved in eight of these transports. The goal was to deport Viennese Jews older than sixty-five.⁴⁶ Children under fourteen were also included, as well as Jewish veterans from World War One whose marriages to non-Jews had been dissolved. There were also smaller deportations of Jews to Theresienstadt (from January to June 1943), consisting of around 100 Jews each time, often elderly.⁴⁷ The policemen under study here were involved in six of these. While earlier transports had used between ten and fifteen policemen plus a leader for each train, the squads were now reduced to five policemen and a leader.⁴⁸ For the final transport for which I have police data (24 June 1943), the local Gestapo ordered the transport, which was comprised of 151 or 152 people and was only guarded by four policemen.⁴⁹ The victims were probably Jews who had been in hiding, who had been denounced, or who had violated various decrees.

Another set of deportations involving the Viennese police comprised over 4,000 Jewish men, women, and children from Macedonia and Thrace, transported by three trains in March 1943 to Malkinia (destination Treblinka). These deportations were organised by the Bulgarian Commissariat for Jewish Affairs (in collaboration with the Germans); roundups and property seizures were conducted by squads of Bulgarian soldiers and police. Bulgarian police guarded the victims as they were transported by barge up the Danube to Vienna; Viennese police records state that they provided the Bulgarian police with provisions and accommodations in the

This corresponds to Hänschen's chart of deportations to Izbica, which lists Izbica as the destination of the transport leaving Vienna on 9 April 1942. Regarding a Jewish deportation that went to Włodawa on 27 April 1942, the unsigned police report (from the 95. Polizei Revier, 4 May 1942, YVA Folio 15) was probably written by Johann Peter II, since he was from that Revier and led at least five transports.

44 Gottwaldt and Schulle, *Die "Judendepportationen" aus dem Deutschen Reich von 1941–1945*, 230–238.

45 For example, the policemen Johann K., Alois K., and Leopold D., who came from 1.Res.Pol.Komp.West and guarded the Minsk transport on 20 May 1942 (YVA Folio 30), were the same team used for a transport to Izbica on 12 May 1942 (Folio 23), with B. (no first name given) taking the place of Anton H.

46 Gottwaldt and Schulle, *Die "Judendepportationen" aus dem Deutschen Reich von 1941–1945*, 277.

47 Gottwaldt and Schulle, *Die "Judendepportationen" aus dem Deutschen Reich von 1941–1945*, 337–342, 347–348, 353, 361. As noted in the footnotes in Part I, "[a]lthough YVA Folio 117 (advancing funds to four policemen) states the transport of 30 March 1943 was a "Zinguener" [sic] transport, the Schutzpolizei order states it was one of three Jewish transports (YVA Folio 110, Kommando der Schutzpolizei, Ia 6260/43, Betr: Gestellung von Begleitkommandos, 29 March 1943). Another reason why this was probably a Jewish transport is that one of the assigned policemen, Anton H. IV, admitted in 1946 that he guarded a Jewish transport to Theresienstadt, consisting of only one wagon attached to a regular train (LPDW, Personalakt H. IV, Anton, St.Nr.857/20 (94/57), PD-Wien, Generalinspektorat der Sicherheitswache, Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 9 September 1946.) Although he stated the date was 1942, he probably got the date wrong. This is not ruled out by his service record, since he admitted that he remained in Vienna in a "special use battalion" until 4 November 1943 before being transferred to The Hague (ibid., Lebenslauf, 25 May 1946)".

48 YVA Folio 93, Kommando der Schutzpolizei, Ia 6260/43, 4 January 1943, Gestellung von Transportkommandos.

49 Gottwaldt and Schulle, *Die "Judendepportationen" aus dem Deutschen Reich von 1941–1945*, 361; YVA Folio 122, Kommando der Schutzpolizei, Ia 6269/24.6, 22 June 1943, Gestellung eines Begleitkommandos.

Otto-Steinhäusl barracks (named for the late Austrian Nazi police president).⁵⁰ Three large, armed Viennese police squads (two squads had fifteen policemen; one had twenty-four) then took over guard duties for the next leg of the journey. The collaboration between different Axis police forces is noteworthy, because the Bulgarian police expelled the victims from the Balkans and transported them into the Reich, and the Austrians moved them to the final extermination centre. This horrible journey for the victims was probably one of the longest trips of anyone deported during the Holocaust.

Finally, out of nine numbered transports to Auschwitz (there were also unnumbered ones and “Einzeltransporte” between 1940 and 1944),⁵¹ there are police records for three Auschwitz trips. The first was a large transport of 995 people, including many women, which left on 17 July 1942. There were also two smaller ones on 3 March and 31 March 1943, the first with seventy-five Jews, the second with approximately eighty-two, of which forty-nine were Romanian.⁵² Importantly, the deportations to Auschwitz in March 1943 were part of a phase in which Jews who were working in war-essential industries, as well as Jews from Axis countries, were now included.⁵³

Were the Policemen Forced to Comply with Orders?

At the end of the war, some policemen remained in Vienna or in Lower Austria because their units had been deployed to defend the city against the incoming Soviet army;⁵⁴ others allegedly were ordered to withdraw to Linz,⁵⁵ while others claimed their unit refused to fight the Soviets, effectively giving them passage into the city.⁵⁶ Still, other policemen came back to the city in 1945 and 1946, after foreign deployment or Allied detention.⁵⁷ Following the Nazi capitulation and the Soviet occupation of Vienna, an Austrian registration staff of the uniformed police (*Erfassungstab der Sicherheitswache*) ordered in April 1945 that Viennese policemen must report for duty, in order to maintain “peace and order” in consultation with the Soviets.⁵⁸ Traditional, moderate, and conservative police officials (all non-Nazis, though some had served under the Nazi regime) re-established the

50 See YVA Folio 109, Kommando der Schutzpolizei, Ia 6260/43, 26 March 1943, Gestellung von Transportkommandos. The Yad Vashem deportation database leaves out the role of the Viennese police in these events, stating only that the Bulgarian Commissariat for Jewish Affairs and the Bulgarian police were involved. Compare <https://deportation.yadvashem.org>, accessed 20 June 2021. See the transports from Greece to Treblinka, leaving on 4, 5, 6, and 7 March 1943.

51 Moser, Tabelle 4, 86.

52 See the Yad Vashem database, Transport 47a, <https://deportation.yadvashem.org/index.html?language=en&itemId=7085829&ind=2> and Transport 47b, <https://deportation.yadvashem.org/index.html?language=en&itemId=7085848&ind=3> (accessed 22 June 2021) for the nationalities of the victims. Moser counted eighty-five victims: see Moser, 86, Tabelle 4. YVA Folio 119, Nachweisung, 29 March 1943, incorrectly gives the destination as “Auspitz”, but this is corrected in Folio 120, Vermerk, 29 March 1943.

53 Richtlinien des RSHA “zur technischen Durchführung der Evakuierung von Juden nach dem Osten (KL Auschwitz)”, 20 February 1943, in Gottwaldt and Schulle, *Die “Judendeportationen” aus dem Deutschen Reich von 1941–1945*, 373–379.

54 LPDW, Personalakt L. I., Leopold, St.Nr.184/24 (301/53), Mein Lebenslauf, 28 June 1946.

55 LPDW, Personalakt S., Thomas, St.Nr.58/36 (116/69), PD-Wien, Generalinspektorat der Sicherheitswache, Referat III/d, Niederschrift, 19 October 1946.

56 LPDW, Personalakt P., Anton, St.Nr.815/20 (149/59), Gruppe Dr. Helfer. Sicherheitswachesektor ehemaliges Schutzpolizei-Gruppenkommando Wien-Süd, 5–6.

57 LPDW, Personalakt B., Franz, St.Nr.31/27 (163/63), Lebenslauf, 23 May 1946.

58 Ulrike Wetz, “Geschichte der Wiener Polizei-Direktion vom Jahre 1945 bis zum Jahre 1955 mit Berücksichtigung der Zeit vor 1945”, PhD dissertation (University of Vienna, 1971), 197.

General Inspectorate of the Sicherheitswache, which became embroiled in a political struggle with the Austrian communists, who had established a rival volunteer police force (*Polizeiliche Hilfsdienst*) and controlled the State Police until September 1947.⁵⁹ The General Inspectorate, following a 1945 law designed to build a non-Nazi civil service,⁶⁰ began examining each policeman who had been in the force between 1938 and 1945 to determine if he had been a Nazi Party member (including an “illegal”) or an SS member, and whether he had denounced any of his colleagues. After examining eighty-four cases, I conclude that the process followed the letter of the law, yet the police bureaucracy was more concerned with group membership in the Nazi Party or SS than with actual actions committed while on duty. The net effect was that participation in deportations was swept under the rug.

There was some type of State Police investigation into policemen who guarded transports, because nineteen personnel files (out of eighty-four, including men who guarded the Stettin transport) contain statements that the policemen gave to an oversight commission (*Überprüfungskommission*) in September and October 1946. The statements begin with the official remark that the policeman “was accused of having participated in Jewish transports as an escort during the Hitler regime, based on a letter from the Staatspolizei from 31 August 1946.”⁶¹ Neither the letter nor the original Staatspolizei investigation could be located in the Austrian State Archives or in the Vienna City Archives, so we currently do not know the extent of the investigation that prompted the recording of these statements, nor which documents the Staatspolizei had.⁶² Many policemen whose names appear in the Schutzpolizei assignment lists and financial records were not apparently questioned. In the existing statements, the policeman usually indicated his assigned Police Battalion, when and where he was trained, and some very basic information about the transport (if he admitted it). Ten admitted guarding a Jewish transport, two denied guarding a Jewish transport but admitted guarding a Roma one, and seven denied any involvement. Six who denied participating are not included in the group of sixty-five (the basis of this paper), because I could not prove through other documents that they guarded transports.⁶³

Eight policemen stated that they had to comply with orders; otherwise, they would have been brought before an SS court and shot. However, key sentences in these statements are identical, indicating that an official working with the Über-

59 Ibid., 180–192, 349–393.

60 Beamtenüberleitungsgesetz (St.GBl.Nr.134/1945).

61 LPDW, Personalakt N., Ludwig, St.Nr.69/25(185/55), Ref.III/d Ueberprüfungskommission, Amtsvermerk, 5 October 1946.

62 The Staatspolizei produced a report about the organisation of Jewish deportations that was used in the trial of Karl Ebner, the Viennese Gestapo official who was head of the Jewish Department (Referat II/D) and then deputy head of the Vienna Gestapo, but this report was from February 1947 and concerned bureaucratic responsibility for ordering deportations in 1942 and 1943 (the Zentralstelle) and in 1944 (Gestapo Referat II/D), and it does not deal with the involvement of the Viennese police as guards (Vg 12 Vr 1223/47). This document is marked A.V. v. 27.2.1947.

63 Admission of a Jewish transport: A., Alois (St.Nr.55/26 (82/64)), B., Anton (St.Nr.669/19 (9/57)), G., Josef (St.Nr.619/36 (15/64)), H., Michael (St.Nr.37/25 (24/62)), H. IV., Anton (St.Nr.857/20 (94/57)), J. I., Alois (St.Nr. 217/23), K., Albin (St.Nr.848/36 (148/61)), P., Josef (St.Nr.797/36 (160/65)), S., Rudolf (St.Nr.918/19 (119/49)), and S., Thomas (St.Nr.58/36 (116/69)). Denial of Jewish transport and admission of Roma transport: B., Johann (St.Nr. 80/34 (239/1969)) and W., Rudolf (St.Nr.67/36 (226/1969)). Denial of any involvement: C. IV, Josef (St.Nr.300/25 (188/56)), G., Anton (St.Nr.102/1947), K., Karl (St.Nr.667/22 (49/60)), N., Oskar (St.Nr.398/28 (131/62)), P., Franz (St.Nr.160/29 (213/1970)), S., Leopold (St.Nr.337/28 (45/66)), and W., Rudolf (St.Nr.224/28 (86/60)). Karl K. is counted as a guard despite his denial because YVA Folio 113 shows he guarded a transport of Thracian and Macedonian Jews to Malkinia (Treblinka) on 25 March 1943. Josef C. IV, Anton G., Oskar N., Leopold S., and Rudolf W. were assigned to the Stettin transport which, as noted above, did not apparently involve deportees. Franz P., whom Johann B. named as a witness (for his involvement in a Roma transport) denied participating in Jewish transports. His name is not mentioned in the Yad Vashem documents, so he was not included in the data analysis of the group of sixty-five.

prüfungscommission possibly wrote them and then had the policemen sign the final product. Thomas S., who admitted guarding a Jewish transport to Kovno in February 1942, stated that the task was “undertaken without pleasure, since each of us knew that after the first or second transport, foreign deployment on the front followed. But it was futile [to refuse], because every individual had to participate in these transports; otherwise, he would have been charged by the SS court with the known draconian consequences (shooting).”⁶⁴ Franz P., who was assigned to the same Reserve Police Battalion for Special Use as Thomas S. and denied involvement, said he recalled that many of his colleagues had to participate without a choice. His key sentence about the consequences is almost identical to Thomas S.’s, as is his statement about imminent deployment to the front: “[n]o one was ordered for these transports willingly, since each knew that after the first or second such transport deployment on the front was coming. *But it was futile [to refuse], because every individual had to participate in these transports; otherwise, he would have been charged by the SS court with the known draconian consequences (shooting)* [my emphasis].”⁶⁵

Some statements by policemen who guarded a Jewish transport to Riga in February 1942 also tried to reduce culpability by claiming that the Jews were fortunate to have had Viennese policemen as escorts. Rudolf S., who admitted to guarding this transport (and who also guarded two others in 1943, according to Schutzpolizei documents),⁶⁶ claimed that the presence of Vienna policemen was positive: “[t]he Jews were happy that Viennese policemen had been assigned to them, since they knew that they were treated humanely and loyally by them.”⁶⁷ Three weeks after Rudolf S. gave his statement, Michael H. used virtually the exact same sentence. After admitting that he guarded two transports in 1942, one to Łódź and one to Šķirotava (outside of Riga, probably the same transport that Rudolf S. guarded), he stated that “I also did not notice that the Jews were insulted or mistreated by anyone. *The Jews were happy that they had been escorted by Vienna policemen, since they knew that they were treated humanely and loyally* [my emphasis].”⁶⁸ The identical language suggests that an official formulated these statements or the policemen were told what to say. Although some Jewish survivors later testified that the Viennese police were not brutal during the loading,⁶⁹ the treatment was harsh during the trip. Testimony at-

64 LPDW, Personalakt S., Thomas, Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungscommission, Niederschrift, 10 September 1946. Original: “Diese Transporte wurden sehr ungerne übernommen, da jeder von uns wusste, dass nach den ersten oder zweiten Transports, der auswärtige Einsatz an die Front folgte. Aber es war zwecklos, weil jeder einzelne an diesen Transports teilnehmen musste, widrigenfalls er mit einer Anzeige an das SS Gericht mit den bekannten drakonischen Folgen (Erschiessung) rechnen musste.”

65 LPDW, Personalakt P., Franz, Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungscommission, Niederschrift, 9 September 1946. “Niemand liess [sic] sich gerne für solche Transporte kommandieren, da jeder wusste, dass er nach einem oder zwei solcher Transport zum Einsatz an die Front komme. *Aber es war zwecklos, da jeder einzelne an diesen Transports als Begleitperson teilnehmen musste, widrigenfalls er mit einer Anzeige an das SS-Gericht mit den bekannten drakonischen Folgen (Erschiessung) rechnen musste* [my emphasis].” I could not confirm through other police documents that Franz P. was assigned to this transport. According to his autobiography, he was sent to Kagran in January 1942 and put into the Pol. Wachbtl. 2. Kompanie, remaining there until 21 February 1943 (ibid., Mein Lebenslauf, 15 April 1946). If he did guard a transport, it would have been in this period, but he denied it in his Ueberprüfungscommission statement.

66 YVA Folios 94, 110, 117.

67 LPDW, Personalakt S. Rudolf, Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungscommission, Niederschrift, 16 September 1946. “Die Juden waren erfreut, dass sie Wiener Polizisten als Begleitung zugeteilt erhielten, da sie wussten, dass sie von diesen menschlich und loyal behandelt werden.”

68 LPDW, Personalakt H., Michael, St.Nr.37/25 (24/62), Ref.III/d Ueberprüfungscommission, Niederschrift, 5 October 1946. “Ich habe auch nicht bemerkt, dass die Juden von irgend jemanden [sic] angestänkert oder misshandelt worden wären. *Die Juden waren froh, dass sie Wiener Polizisten als Begleitung erhalten hatten, da sie wussten, dass sie von diesen menschlich und loyal behandelt werden* [my emphasis].”

69 USC Shoah Foundation, Visual History Archive, Interview Dr. Helga Feldner-Busztin, 28 December 1998, No. 48497, Tape 3, 2:50–3:28.

tributed to Wolf Seiler states that people were beaten on platforms, were later transferred from passenger cars to cattle cars (where they were locked in), and went insane.⁷⁰ Herbert Schwarz, deported to Riga in January 1942, reported that he (as a young Jewish “gofer” on the transport) and other orderlies were instructed to pry up dead bodies frozen to the floor of the luggage car and move them, and they were whipped.⁷¹

The two policemen who admitted to guarding a Roma transport to Łódź in November 1941 gave limited information about the situation. Rudolf W., who was a member of the Reserve Police Battalion for Special Use stationed at Wiener Neudorf, said he was excused from a Jewish transport because he was a trainer (*Ausbildner*) for his unit; he claimed, however, that he had no choice but to guard a transport of Roma (Gypsies, *Zigeunern*) from Mattersburg to Łódź because there was a shortage of personnel. He too used the same justification that refusal would have resulted in a charge before the SS court and “the known draconian consequences (shooting).”⁷² In a separate, later Volksgericht investigation, not related to the transports, he was accused of training Ukrainian police in Galicia and participating in the mass murder of Jews in the ghetto at Stanislaw.⁷³ Johann B., who was in the same Reserve Police Battalion for Special Use as Rudolf W., said that during his training period at Wiener Neudorf he was ordered to Fürstenfeld, where the gendarmerie had brought Roma to a nearby labour camp.⁷⁴ They were then loaded on trains, which his unit guarded and then unloaded in the ghetto at Łódź. He merely stated that there were “no incidents” during the transport. Another policeman, Alois A., admitted to belonging to a fifteen-man group from the Reserve Police Battalion for Special Use that guarded a Jewish transport to Riga in February 1942.⁷⁵ Both Johann B. and Alois A. gave the same justification that they were under orders and would have been brought up on charges and shot if they had not complied.

One may reasonably doubt whether policemen would have been executed for refusing. No cases of refusal appear in the files of the SS courts (archived in Berlin and Vienna); instead, the courts were arguably used to discipline police who engaged in “excessive” beating or rape, did not follow orderly, “rational” killing routines, or who were accused of sodomy. In this light, the courts served as a control mechanism to reinforce the concept of correct behaviour for a male figure of the “German master race.”⁷⁶ Additionally, some Viennese policemen claimed they did not have to partic-

70 DÖW 854, undated report from after 1945, p. 1.

71 USC Shoah Foundation, Visual History Archive, Interview Herbert Schwarz, 30 June 1995, No. 3634.

72 LPDW, Personalakt W., Rudolf, St.Nr.67/36 (226/1969), Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 10 September 1946.

73 Ibid., PD Wien I/59067, Auszugsweise Abschrift a.d. Sammelakt Stanislaw, 18 January 1948.

74 LPDW, Personalakt B., Johann, St.Nr. 80/34 (239/1969), Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 10 September 1946.

75 LPDW, Personalakt A., Alois, St.Nr.55/26 (82/64), Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 9 September 1946.

76 In the Bundesarchiv (Berlin-Lichterfelde), NS 7 (SS- und Polizeigerichtsbarkeit), I only found four cases dealing with Schutzpolizisten, none concerning refusal to comply with deportation orders. For a case of a Schutzpolizist (Ludwig Wölfer) accused of murdering without command in Radom, Poland (and the question of when his sentence could be converted to probation, so that he could be transferred to an anti-partisan unit), see BA NS 7/6592. For the case of a dentist in the Schutzpolizei in Stettin, sentenced to five years in a Straflager in Danzig-Matzkau for homosexual activity, see BA NS 7/1083. The dentist requested that he be castrated, which was approved by a doctor, who said the dentist engaged in mutual masturbation, not oral or anal sex; the dentist's request might indicate that the punishment system led men to go to extremes to avoid going to a camp. The dentist also requested a pardon (after his castration), but the records do not show whether he was in fact castrated or pardoned. For the case of a Viennese Kriminalbeamte found guilty of sodomy with underage men and sent to Dachau, see Mark Lewis, “Continuity and Change in the Vienna Police Force, 1914–1945. Part 1 [1914–33]”, *S:I.M.O.N. Shoah: Intervention. Methods. DocumentatiON*, 6, no. 2 (2020): 40–41. For the case of

ipate for various reasons. Thomas S., who admitted guarding a Jewish transport (see above), stated that he was able to avoid other transports because he was a member of the policemen's sports association (*Polizei Sport-Vereinigung*).⁷⁷ He does not explain how that created an exception. Franz P., assigned to the same Reserve Police Battalion for Special Use, said that other men in his unit were required to guard Jewish transports, but he had avoided it because he had an accident in 1940 and was only minimally fit for duty. There are no medical records in his file confirming this, however, and in February 1943 he was assigned to a police battalion successively deployed to Slovenia, France, and Alsace; he said he was its "Schreiber", (a clerk or typist for the unit), so he was not incapable of working.⁷⁸ Another policeman in the same battalion said he was having dental work done at the time and could not be assigned to foreign duty.⁷⁹ There are no documents in the policemen's files showing that they actually used these excuses at the time of the orders, or that they were excused. They may have invented these statements in 1946 to keep their jobs.

The proposed model of stages leading to compliance fits the data better than theories that chart the evolution of German police organisational culture (as opposed to Austrian police institutions), ideological indoctrination through police schools, or the role of junior officers who set the example of decisive, violent behaviour.⁸⁰ First, starting in the late nineteenth century, policemen's prejudicial beliefs about Jews and foreigners were reinforced by everyday culture, religion, and political parties. The police also reinforced and supported politicians' views that travelling Roma constituted a "criminal plague" and should be expelled. Second, in the 1920s and 1930s, existing police command structures became more authoritative and less responsive to individual rights due to the political context of fascism. Third, in the late 1930s, antisemitic decrees and anti-Roma police orders set harsh social boundaries that, in the minds of policemen, legitimised deportation and made compliance easier. Fourth, the negative aspects of war (mobilisation, bombardment, food shortages, destruction) ended normal relationships between the police and the people they patrolled: true Austrians were Germans, while other groups deserved no protection. To sum up, the police complied with deportation orders without cognitive dissonance because of their belief system, the privileging of police over individual rights, the establishment of social boundaries, and the effects of war, creating a legitimising cover.

Post-war Reinstatement

To what extent was the Vienna police denazified after 1945, and why was police participation in guarding transports not considered in reinstatement decisions? Scholars have addressed the first question, but they had to rely on figures produced by the Austrian and Allied governments and did not have access to personnel re-

a head of a local Sicherheitsdienst branch in occupied Yugoslavia who was convicted of murder and rape by the SS and Police Court in Belgrade, see Götz Aly, "The Universe of Death and Torment", in *Unwilling Germans: The Goldhagen Debate*, ed. Robert R. Shandley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 171.

77 LPDW, Personalakt S., Thomas, Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 10 September 1946.

78 LPDW, Personalakt P., Franz, Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 9 September 1946.

79 LPDW, Personalakt W., Rudolf, St.Nr.224/28 (86/60), Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 16 September 1946. This is a different Rudolf W. than the one who admitted guarding a Roma transport (St. Nr.67/36 [226/1969]).

80 See Edward B. Westermann, *Hitler's Police Battalions: Enforcing Racial War in the East* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2005); Hans-Christian Harten, *Die weltanschauliche Schulung der Polizei in Nationalsozialismus* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh/Brill, 2018); Rich, *Holocaust Perpetrators of the German Police Battalions*; and the historiographic discussion in Lewis, "Wheels and Cogs", Part 1.

cords that enables an analysis of the lower ranks.⁸¹ They have not addressed the second question, because they may not have known that there had been a Staatspolizei investigation resulting in the General Inspectorate taking statements from policemen. The personnel records, which extensively document the post-war reinstatement process, show that no policeman was dismissed for the deportations: out of sixty-five, ultimately only eleven were dismissed for other reasons. Why was participating in deportations swept under the rug? First, the post-war police officials wanted to rebuild their ranks with trained policemen, and reinstated officers fit the bill. Second, they wanted to create an image that the new police force was comprised of “loyal Austrians”, based on political membership and political reliability, excusing or ignoring questionable actions committed by police who were not Nazis. Third, police officials wanted to preserve social cohesion and promote the welfare of the police as a social institution by keeping policemen employed.

Ulrike Wetz, in a dissertation about the Viennese police between 1945 and 1954, hardly mentions the commission of war crimes (not to mention crimes against humanity) at all.⁸² She contends that the post-war reconstruction of the Viennese Sicherheitswache was a Cold War struggle: non-Nazi, supposedly democratically-oriented police traditionalists tried to build a new force to deal with Vienna’s dire security problems and wrest power from the communist-controlled *Polizeiliche Hilfsdienst* (a volunteer force comprised of former resistance fighters, civil servants, and Wehrmacht deserters) and from the *Staatspolizei* (state police), controlled by communists until September 1947.⁸³ She uses data on hiring and terminations in the Sicherheitswache from 1945 to 1948 to argue that up to two-thirds of the force was changed through new recruitments, retirements, and dismissals in 1945 and 1946, a replacement process that would normally take fifteen to twenty years. This allegedly shows how thoroughly the Nazis were removed from the force.⁸⁴ The problem with this interpretation is that it does not break down dismissals and transfers by reason, so one does not know who was dismissed for Nazi activity (and what type thereof), who was dismissed for other political reasons (such as being a communist), and who was dismissed for failing to pass physical fitness exams. In fact, some cases of reinstatement show that the police administration was willing to find desk jobs for policemen injured in the war.⁸⁵ Furthermore, Wetz did not have access to personnel files showing cases of policemen who had applied or belonged to the Nazi Party after 1938 yet were still reinstated after 1945.

Dieter Stiefel argues that Austrians had more control over their own denazification than the Germans because Austrians wrote their own denazification legislation, although the Allies pressured them to strengthen their denazification laws and revise them in 1947. He holds that once former Nazis were allowed to vote again in the 1949 elections, Austria’s denazification process was over, despite the fact that Austrian People’s Courts (*Volksgerichte*) continued until 1955 to pursue war crimes cases

81 Wetz, “Geschichte der Wiener Polizei-Direktion vom Jahre 1945 bis zum Jahre 1955 mit Berücksichtigung der Zeit vor 1945”, 338, 351; Dieter Stiefel, *Entnazifizierung in Österreich* (Vienna, Munich, and Zurich: Europaverlag, 1981), 154–160.

82 Wetz, “Geschichte der Wiener Polizei-Direktion vom Jahre 1945 bis zum Jahre 1955 mit Berücksichtigung der Zeit vor 1945”, 332–334.

83 *Ibid.*, 348–421.

84 *Ibid.*, 335–338.

85 See the case of Albin K., whose leg was amputated, later in this article. Thomas S., who was run over by a truck (driven by the SS), was given a job as a boat instructor (LPDW, Personalakt S., Thomas, Bitte um Dienstzuteilung zur Zillenfahrerabtlg., 18 March 1946).

and cases of illegal membership in the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1938.⁸⁶ The decisions about whether to reinstate these policemen occurred during three events: the Allied occupation of Austria; the power struggle inside the police administration between the traditional police professionals on the one side and the communist-controlled Staatspolizei and the Polizeiliche Hilfsdienst on the other; and the evolution of Austrian attitudes toward the Nazi past between 1945 and 1954, when Austria regained its sovereignty. Initially, some Austrians supported the “Opferthese” (the victim thesis: “the Germans imposed their ideology on us and occupied our country”), then moved to partial recognition of responsibility (“we had our Nazis and fellow-travelers, and the hard-core ones should be excluded from civil professions and participation in politics”). After 1948, this was followed by partial amnesty combined with a Cold War political calculation: “[i]t’s more democratic to allow former Nazis to have their rights again if they have renounced their views and support the Republic. And we must oppose the communists.”⁸⁷ By the 1950s, in the case of the Viennese police authorities, there was relativisation and amnesia. For example, the general inspector intervened twice to lift the suspension of Rudolf W., whom Volksgericht prosecutors investigated twice for allegedly murdering civilians in Stanislaw. In 1949, the General Inspectorate argued that if his suspension was not lifted, he would look for work elsewhere, so it was essentially protecting him and claiming his innocence.⁸⁸ He was reinstated in 1949, and the Austrian President, Theodor Körner, suspended disciplinary proceedings against him in 1952.⁸⁹ In 1957, when Rudolf W. was not allowed to enrol in an officer training program, the General Inspector personally wrote an astonishing memo that shows that he wanted to clear almost the entire Viennese uniformed police; in case of Viennese policemen accused of mass murder in Galicia, it was just a matter of a few bad apples. “For the accused, who for ten years now were the object of a legal investigation, absolutely no proof has been found, and it can hardly be produced because of the passage of time and the foreign location; moreover, only a limited number of members of the Schutzpolizei under discussion may have participated in the aforementioned excesses.”⁹⁰

Apart from the statements that the General Inspectorate took (or wrote) from a limited number of policemen who guarded deportation trains, their involvement played no role in whether they should be reinstated. It instead depended on whether they had belonged to the Nazi Party and the SS, which greatly limited consideration of their involvement in controlling and policing Viennese society.

In 1945 and 1946, policemen had to fill out a police questionnaire about their past political affiliations and ranks, as well as write a short autobiographical statement about their career path. The police administration checked Nazi Party records and interviewed their work colleagues and neighbours, who rarely criticised or denounced anyone. Under the terms of the 1945 law dealing with the transition to a new civil service, the *Beamtenüberleitungsgesetz* (St.GBl.Nr.134/1945), policemen who were in the force during the Nazi period but were not Nazi Party members (either during the illegal period or after 1938) and were not SS members could be

86 Stiefel, *Entnazifizierung in Österreich*, 18–19, 247–259.

87 Ibid., 48–75. See also Robert Knight, “Denazification and Integration in the Austrian Province of Carinthia”, *The Journal of Modern History* 79, no. 3 (2007): 572–612; Siegfried Göllner, “The Politics of Denazification: Parliamentary Debates in Austria, 1945–57”, *Parliaments, Estates and Representation* 38, no. 1 (2018): 76–87.

88 LPDW, Personalakt W. Rudolf, St.Nr.67/36 (226/1969), G.I., IIb, Gesuch an den Herrn Bundespräsidenten um gnadenweise Einstellung eines eingeleiteten Disziplinarverfahrens, 19 January 1952, 24–25.

89 Ibid., 27, Generaldirektion für die öffent. Sicherheit to Bundespolizeidirektion, Zl. 80.257-3/52, 7 June 1952 (Abschrift).

90 Ibid., 55, Generalinspektor to Disziplinarkommission, G.I.-IIb-2141/24/7-56, 28 August 1957.

rehired.⁹¹ According to the data in this study, in 1945 and 1946, only six policemen who had guarded transports were removed, either because they had been party members, applicants, or SS members.⁹² There were no detailed investigations into policemen's later foreign deployments (when they might have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity), nor consequences for having admitted to guarding a deportation transport. Furthermore, five of them were reinstated in 1947 and 1949 after they appealed their dismissals. Sometimes (but not always) these were cases in which the policemen had applied to join the Nazi Party after 1938 but had not received membership. The police administration tended to view them as men who had been pressured, made mistakes, or were actually "true Austrians".⁹³

In 1947 the Austrian parliament revised the denazification laws (the *Bundesverfassungsgesetz* of 6 February 1947) to create two levels of "incriminated persons": a lower level (*Minderbelastet*) and a higher level (*Belastet*). Lower-level incriminated persons included regular Nazi Party members, and higher-level incriminated persons were defined as war criminals (specified by a 1945 law called the *Kriegsverbrechergesetz*), Nazi Party members at the rank of cell leader or higher, all SS members, and Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst members at the rank of *Untersturmführer* (second lieutenant) or higher.⁹⁴ The two types of incriminated persons had to register with the authorities and could be punished for failing to do so or for providing false information.

After the passage of the 1947 law, the General Inspectorate continued using the same process of a questionnaire, autobiographical statement, background interviews, and a check of Nazi-era records to determine who could be reinstated. Policemen classified as *Minderbelastet* were not allowed to work for the police again unless their "political behaviour" had been examined by a review commission, which voted on their cases.⁹⁵ In the period from 1947 to 1948 period, another twelve policemen in

91 The *Beamtenüberleitungsgesetz* (St.GBl.Nr.134/1945) gave hiring preference in the civil service to persons who were dismissed for political reasons (except Nazi activity) during the Dollfuß-Schuchnigg era or had been resistance fighters. However, the section which the General Inspectorate often used was Paragraph 6 (3), which said that if a civil servant had been hired prior to the Nazi takeover and had remained in service after 13 March 1938, the person could be considered for rehiring.

92 LPDW, Personalakten H., Anton (St.Nr.68/30 (343/64)); H. IV, Josef (St.Nr.96/35 (42/72)); M., Otto (St.Nr. 291/18(253/47)); P., Anton (St.Nr.815/20 (149/59)); R., Karl (St.Nr. 236/23 (107/63)); S., Franz (St.Nr.525/20 (98/61)).

93 For example, Anton H. (1907–1995) was initially removed because he belonged to the Nazi Party since 1941, but he was reinstated in 1949 due to character references claiming he had been pressured and was an "idealist" (see Lewis, "Wheels and Cogs", Part 1, 27–28, n. 92). Anton P. was removed in July 1946 due to suspected NSDAP membership but was reinstated in January 1947 because he produced witness testimony and a report claiming he had been in a resistance group (Personalakt P., Anton, docs. 14, 16, 26–31, 42). Otto M. was the only one who was not reinstated. Initially dismissed because documents showed that he had applied to the SS in 1937, a *Volksgesetz* ruled that this was a backdated application. It also found that he was not an illegal Nazi but had only belonged to the party from 1938 to 1945, despite some documents showing the contrary. A district registration list commission granted his appeal that his designation should be changed from the higher level of incrimination to the lower. Still, the police had a legal basis to refuse his reinstatement: his Nazi Party membership (for citations, see n. 37).

94 Wetz, "Geschichte der Wiener Polizei-Direktion vom Jahre 1945 bis zum Jahre 1955 mit Berücksichtigung der Zeit vor 1945", 325.

95 The *Verbotsgesetz* of 1947 (St.GBl.Nr.25/1946) stated that policemen who were at the lower level of incrimination (for example, former party members) could only rejoin the police "by necessity and after a special examination of their political behaviour before 27 April 1945" (§ 19 (1) (b) (bb) (2)). The law stated that the commission was supposed to be comprised of the interior minister or his deputy, a representative from the Interior Ministry, a representative from the policemen's professional organisation (a labour union), and representatives from each of the three officially recognised political parties (§ 19 (3)). In some police documents, this commission was called the "Kommission nach § 19 des Verbotsgesetzes 1947 beim Bundesministerium für Inneres", although when it convened for voting it was called the "Interne Kommission des Generalinspektorates" (Internal Commission of the General Inspectorate) and actually had eight members. The commission heard a report (which summarised the results of the background investigation), then voted.

the sample were dismissed and pensioned off because they had been illegal Nazis or belonged to the party after 1938.⁹⁶ However, some of these, who had been required to register as *Belastet*, appealed to their municipal district's complaint commission (*Beschwerdekommision*, separate from the police's review commission) on the grounds that they had not been illegal Nazis, or that they were not real SS members, because they were required to join the *Polizei SS* and had received an SS rank equivalent to their police rank. Courts and registration authorities upheld this viewpoint.⁹⁷ Some policemen who successfully won this appeal turned next to the General Inspectorate and requested reinstatement in the force. Others were in detention pending war crimes investigations on allegations that they had been illegal Nazis or had participated in mass murders in Galicia.⁹⁸ When the latter investigations were ultimately suspended in the 1950s, these policemen also asked to be reinstated. Therefore, from the group of twelve initially dismissed in 1947 and 1948, four were ultimately reinstated,⁹⁹ and a fifth, Johann Pflamitzer, who had been a transport

96 LPDW, Personalakten: B., Josef, St.Nr.148/24 (446/47); F., Johann, St.Nr.215/25 (94/1947); J. I., Alois, St.Nr.217/23; K., Johann, St.Nr.1298/19 (480/50), K., Othmar, St.Nr.73/25 (137/63); Pflamitzer, Johann, St.Nr.332/1923(296/47); R., Franz, St.Nr.177/1923(952/45); S., Johann (II), St.Nr.244/46; T., Josef, St.Nr.52/26 (226/63); T., Josef, St.Nr.542/36 (300/52); W. XII., Johann, St.Nr.423/47; W., Rudolf, St.Nr.67/36 (226/1969).

97 Personalakt B., Josef, Bundesministerium für Inneres, Beschwerdekommision, BK 6448/48, Entscheidung, 2 June 1950; Personalakt F., Johann, Beschwerdekommision, BK 83/51, 28 June 1951. This caused a Volksgericht to overturn its decision that he had joined the SS voluntarily; Personalakt K., Othmar, Beschwerdekommision, BK 551/50, 17 June 1950. Nevertheless, in all three cases, the policemen were denied reinstatement because documents still showed they had belonged to the Nazi Party after March 1938.

98 Two policemen who guarded deportation transports and were later investigated for mass murders in this area (today in Ukraine) were Rudolf W. (already mentioned) and Johann K. According to Schutzpolizei records, Johann K. guarded two transports of Jews, one to Izbica and one to Minsk, in May 1942 (YVA, Folio 23, I 2501/42 Vermerk, 9 May 1942, and Folio 30, I 2501/42 Vermerk, 19 May 1942.) He was then deployed to Stryj in Galicia from June 1942 to October 1944 and was accused by other policemen after the war of having led a murder commando there (LPDW, Personalakt K., Johann, St.Nr.1298/19 (480/50), Auszugsweise Abschrift der Anzeige d. Staatspolizei, I/5527/47 v. 18.11.1947 an die Staatsanwaltschaft Wien). After an initial Austrian war crimes investigation in 1947, he was handed over to the Soviets, who sentenced him to twenty-five years and held him in various labour camps in the Soviet Union until 1955, roughly a year after Austria regained its independence (*ibid.*, Niederschrift aufgenommen mit Pol.-Rev.-Insp.i.P. Johann K., 22 November 1955). A year later, in 1956, Austrian prosecutors reopened the investigation of his activities in Stryj (*ibid.*, Pol. Abt. 15 St 24119/55, 23.7.1956). A witness said that he had shot forty-two Jews in a slaughterhouse after they had been captured in a bunker (*ibid.*, Abschrift, Geschäftszahl 31 Vr 3331/56, Benachrichtigung), but Johann K. denied involvement in any shootings and said that he had only directed street traffic (*ibid.*, G.I.-IIb, Niederschrift aufgenommen mit Pol.-Rev.-Insp.i.P. Johann K., 13 September 1957). The investigation was suspended in 1957 on the order of Austria's president. Police disciplinary proceedings against him were also suspended (on the grounds that he could not be investigated for activities while he was employed by the Third Reich, not Austria), but he was not rehired (*ibid.*, OrNr. 70 and 71, G.I.-IIb-2121a/185/30-56, 7 August 1958).

99 These were Alois J., Othmar K., Josef T. (St.Nr. 52/26 (226/63)), and Rudolf W. (St.Nr.67/36 (226/1969)). Alois J. was initially dismissed due to a Soviet order, but the Viennese police reversed it. No document showed he was a Nazi, though he admitted to guarding a transport to Riga (Personalakt, J., Alois, Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 7 September 1946). Othmar K. had been a Nazi from 1932 to 1934, then withdrew during the illegal period and rejoined in 1938. He was first dismissed in 1947, and even though a Beschwerdekommision believed his claims that he was forced to rejoin the party and pressured to join the *Polizei SS*, the General Inspector and the State Police did not want to reinstate him, believing that he had a Nazi orientation. However, a state secretary from the Interior Ministry personally wrote to the General Inspector and got him reinstated in 1953 (Personalakt K., Othmar, doc. 48, Staatssekretär to General Täubler, 15 April 1953). Josef T. joined the party in 1933, left when it was illegal, then rejoined in 1941. He was dismissed in 1948 and repeatedly applied for reinstatement, which was approved by the Internal Commission in 1949, which said that even though he had been a party member, there was nothing politically negative about him (Personalakt T., Josef, Protokoll der Sitzung der internen Kommission des Generalinspektorates, 26 March 1949). The Generaldirektion für die öffentliche Sicherheit (which supervised the police) said in 1950 that reinstatements were not going to be considered until further notice, but he was reinstated in 1952 (*ibid.*, G.I.-IIIa-2-14/61/8, Wiederindienststellung von 21 Sicherheitswachbeamten des Ruhestandes, 15 July 1952). According to Schutzpolizei documents, he guarded a Jewish transport to Auschwitz on 3 March 1943 and one to Theresienstadt on 24 June 1943 (YVA, Folios 106, 124).

leader, was actually not forced to retire until 1956, though that was an exceptional case.¹⁰⁰

Overall (see Table 8), the data show that forty-six of the sixty-five (71 per cent) who had guarded transports were reinstated. Although there were initially twenty-two dismissals, eleven got their jobs back after appeals, so only eleven were ultimately dismissed (17 per cent). Regarding the rest, six were killed in the war or declared dead (9 per cent), there are no post-war records for one, and another one was approved for re-instatement but did not rejoin the force because he failed to appear for his medical exam.

Table 8: Reinstatements

Reinstated post-Second World War	46	70.77%	Includes 5 Nazi Party members
Dismissed (forced retirement)	11	16.92%	All belonged to the Nazi Party, but two joined in October 1940
Approved for reinstatement but did not show up for medical exam (hence did not re-join force)	1	1.54%	
Missing and declared dead, or killed in the war	6	9.23%	
Unknown (no post-war records)	1	1.54%	
Total	65	100.00%	

Why did the deportations not matter? The legal constraints established by the Austrian parliament created the concept that membership in the Nazi Party, illegal membership between 1933 and 1938, and activity to support the Nazi movement (even without belonging to an organisation) were forms of treason against independent Austria. These categories, not an individual examination into a policeman's actions, could separate incorrigible Austrians from ones who could be re-educated. This was based on the idea that most Austrians were good at heart and had been victimised by the Germans. The real culprits in the police were supposedly the "Reichsdeutsche", the Germans who served in senior positions, despite the fact that both police presidents, Steinhäusl and Gotzmann, were Austrian Nazis. Alois A., for example, who admitted guarding a transport to Riga, claimed his transport leader was a Reichsdeutscher, though he could not remember the name or the names of the fifteen other policemen on the trip.¹⁰¹ A post-war complaint commission (dealing with appeals for changes to the Nazi registration list) claimed that the reason policemen's SS applications were falsely backdated to show that they had applied when the organisation was illegal was so that Steinhäusl could retain a sufficient proportion of Austrians versus Reichsdeutsche.¹⁰²

Wetz's hypothesis that police authorities reinstated men in order to increase the size of the force, which they believed was necessary to secure Vienna against crime and outnumber the Polizeiliche Hilfsdienst, is also plausible. By gradually inserting trained policemen into the precincts as instructors and advisors, purging members of the Hilfsdienst who had criminal records or were physically unsuitable, and re-

100 Pflamitzer joined the police in 1923 and the Nazi Party in 1932, remaining an illegal Nazi. After the war, a Volksgericht ruled that he was an illegal and had denounced two policemen, sentencing him to two years in prison in 1949. The judgment was later vacated and further prosecution suspended (Vg 8e Vr 543/55). Nothing in the prosecution ever concerned his leading deportation transports.

101 LPDW, Personalakt A., Alois, Ref.IV. Ueberprüfungskommission, Niederschrift, 9 September 1946.

102 LPDW, Personalakt B., Josef, BK 6448/48, 4.

moving the communists from the Staatspolizei leadership in 1947, the traditionalist police leadership, with the support of both the Social Democratic and Austrian People's Parties, succeeded in reducing the number of communists in the police. This Cold War political struggle might have been the context, though it was not explicit in cases researched for this study. The fact that so many were reinstated without fully examining their actual activities (in Vienna and abroad) counters Wetz's claim that, because two-thirds of the force was changed in 1945 and 1946, the police was fully transformed to serve the Second Republic.¹⁰³ Both former Nazis and non-Nazi policemen who had deported Austrians (and other nationals) to their deaths remained in the force. Twenty-eight did not retire until the period from 1961 to 1974.

Another factor that may have led police authorities to ignore the policemen's role in deportations (or accept the view that they followed orders) was sympathy for their economic and social situation. Some policemen stated in their autobiographies and correspondence that they had been wounded in the war, their apartments had been destroyed by Allied bombing, or they helped rebuild bombed-out police stations. Virtually all had families and children, so one can infer that the police authorities believed that if a policeman had not joined the Nazi Party, and he had been in the force since the 1920s or 1930s, he had a right to employment again. Albin K., for example, who admitted guarding a transport to Kovno, was shot in the leg in 1943 in Ukraine; his leg had to be amputated.¹⁰⁴ His first wife died of tuberculosis in 1943, and he married a second time in June 1945. According to the wife of his building's caretaker, Albin K. opposed Nazism and had told a female air-raid attendant, an ardent Nazi, to take down a picture of Hitler from an air-raid cellar. His colleagues from the police station on Tannengasse said that he was not Nazi oriented.¹⁰⁵ Never a Nazi Party member, he was reinstated. Johann W., who, according to Schutzpolizei records, guarded a Jewish transport to Izbica on 15 May 1942 and a Jewish transport to Auschwitz from 17 to 19 July 1942,¹⁰⁶ was also reinstated. Those facts never emerged in his post-war reinstatement process. His postwar autobiography described that he was a former plumber who joined the police in 1921. Born in Moravia to a single mother, he moved to Vienna at the age of six, and he was drafted into the Habsburg Army in 1915, when he was wounded and contracted malaria.¹⁰⁷ He claimed in his post-war questionnaire that he had belonged to the Social Democratic Party from 1929 to 1934 and then the Fatherland Front until 1938 (the only political organisation allowed during the Austro-fascist period); neither claim was apparently checked, though they are plausible.¹⁰⁸ There were no records showing he was a Nazi Party member, and a very brief post-war police report said that he was a Nazi opponent and a "good comrade and Austrian".¹⁰⁹ He and his wife had a son who was draft-

103 Wetz, 355.

104 LPDW, Personalakt, K., Albin, Kommando der Schutzpolizei, 2b-3160/17.11, 19 November 1943.

105 Ibid., Erhebungsbericht, 10 June 1945.

106 YVA, Folios 25, 56–57, showing he was assigned to these transports and given travel advances. For the Auschwitz trip, he was also reimbursed for additional costs. In a second autobiography written in 1946 (after he had been reinstated), he said that had been denounced in March 1938 by Nazis who wanted him removed from the police because he had taken action against them during the illegal period (for distributing party flyers). However, he claims he was only transferred to a different station. He did not provide a detailed chronology of his posts during the war, only stating that he had bookkeeping and patrol duties and was then assigned to a police company in March 1945 that was sent to Hollabrunn. He said he directed street traffic in various towns along the path of the Wehrmacht's withdrawal. LPDW, Personalakt, W., Johann, St.Nr.488/21 (249/56), Ansuchen um Aufnahme in den Chargen-Kurzkurs 1946, Lebenslauf, 27 May 1946.

107 Ibid., Lebenslauf, 24 September 1945.

108 Ibid., Grundblatt, 24 September 1945.

109 Ibid., Ergänzungsbericht, 27 September 1945.

ed into the Wehrmacht in 1942 and was taken prisoner by the Soviets in 1945, not returning to Vienna until 1947.¹¹⁰ Probably seen as a family man, a policeman who had done his duty and had been on the police force for decades, and not fitting any of the definitions of the denazification laws, he was reinstated in September 1945. Therefore, the General Inspectorate's examination of the policemen's past might not have been influenced only by the Cold War struggle against the communists. It might have also been influenced by a sympathetic view that they had been loyal Austrians who were forced to tolerate a harsh situation under Nazism (over which they supposedly had no control), and by a pragmatic belief that their manpower was needed to restore public order after the Nazi defeat. The role of regular policemen guarding deportation trains could be concealed or cordoned off as an unfortunate event ordered by the Nazis, and policemen could say "I had to follow orders". Yet, as this article has shown, they complied without extreme duress, a process influenced by the four-stage process detailed above.

110 Ibid., Bezirkspolizeikommissariat, Währing, Amtsnotiz, 24 December 1947.

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